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Incentive-based pay is rational, intuitive, and popular. Agency theory tells us
that a principal seeking to align its incentives with an agent's should be able to
simply pay the agent to achieve the principal's desired results. Indeed, this
strategy has long been used across diverse industries-from executive
compensation to education, professional sports to public service-but with mixed
results. Now a new convert to incentive compensation has appeared on the scene:
the United States' behemoth health-care industry. In many ways, the incentive
mismatch story is the same. Insurance companies and employers are concerned
about constraining the cost of care, and patients are concerned about quality of
care. Physicians lack an adequate financial incentive to pay attention to either.
Health care's recent move away from the traditional fee-for-service
compensation model to incentive pay is perhaps unsurprising.
But there is a problem: mixed preliminary evidence and potential mal-effects
on vulnerable third-party patients. This Article employs a new lens-the legal
and behavioral literature on optimal contract specificity-to suggest why
incentive pay is problematic and why the health-care experience will be no
different than other industries. The use of incentive pay is a change in contract-
drafting strategy, a decision to write a more detailed, control-based contract
rather than one that relies on discretion. The contracts literature suggests that this
strategy will only work well where simple compliance is the goal rather than
creativity or innovation. The health industry will not succeed in implementing
incentive pay better than other industries have. What it needs is to recognize the
limits of incentive pay and implement it sparingly. The new Trump
Administration may be particularly primed to heed this call.
. Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law; Faculty Director, Mary & Michael
Jaharis Health Law Institute. With thanks to Monu Bedi, Lisa Bernstein, Christopher Buccafusco,
Emily Cauble, Karen Dunn, Barry Furrow, David Hoffman, Michael Jacobs, Gregory Mark, Brian
Netter, Frank Pasquale, Thaddeus Pope, Zoe Robinson, Nadia Sawicki, Christopher Schmidt,
Robert Scott, Sidney Watson, and Jonathan Will for comments and suggestions about this paper. I
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AALS Section on Law, Medicine & Health Care's Session on Works-in-Progress for New Law
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INTRODUCTION
Incentive-based compensation has its roots in classic economic theory:
rational, selfish actors who are motivated to maximize their own wealth will do
their best work if they will get a financial reward for doing so. Material
incentives are generally believed to be powerful motivators. The Aztecs
rewarded successful warriors with land and better food.' Roman warriors were
2rewarded in the same ways. The use of financial incentives in particular is now
pervasive across very different industries, from executive compensation to
professional sports and education.3 Common sense and economic principles both
suggest that connecting pay to quality metrics will yield better results.
Incentive pay is a concept that almost everyone seems to be able to get
behind. Indeed, incentive regimes are a part of the new ideological hybrid-
libertarian paternalism-that encourages behavior by making it attractive without
regulating it.4 The liberal Obama Administration has firmly embraced the idea,
arguing that rewarding excellence with pay improves quality.5 And conservatives
generally support incentive pay because it is essentially a private, market-based
solution.6 It remains to be seen if the new Trump Administration will stay the
course or not, but there is reason to believe it may not.
1. See MONICA DOMINGUEZ TORRES, MILITARY ETHOS AND VISUAL CULTURE IN POST-
CONQUEST MEXICO 23 (2013).
2. See James Lloyd, Roman Army, ANCIENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.ancient.eu/RomanArmy [https://perma.cc/VD26-XJVP].
3. See infra Part III.A. for further discussion of other industries' use of incentive pay.
4. See Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175
(2003) (coining the term libertarian paternalism); see also Eric Felten, Age of Incentives:
Paying Big Bucks for Puny Results, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 18, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704009804575308710787390320
[https://perma.cc/N587-SRYZ] (discussing proliferation of incentive pay as a form of
libertarian paternalism).
5. In his March 2009 education speech, Obama argued, "Too many supporters of my party
have resisted the idea of rewarding excellence in teaching with extra pay, even though we know it
can make a difference in the classroom." Press Release, White House, Remarks of the President to
the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 10, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-states-hispanic-
chamber-commerce [https://perma.cc/C7PL-JLLJ].
6. Exec. Order No. 13,410, 71 Fed. Reg. 51089 (Aug. 22, 2006) ("Each agency shall
develop and identify, for beneficiaries, enrollees, and providers, approaches that encourage ...
high-quality and efficient health care."); Juleanna Glover, A Budget Win in a Conservative
Approach to Social Programs?, WALL ST. J.: WASHINGTON WIRE (Dec. 30, 2014)
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/30/a-budget-win-in-a-conservative-approach-to-social-
programs [https://perma.cc/RW48-5VT8] (discussing conservative approaches for social
program reimbursements that utilize pay-for-performance schemes).
7. The Trump Administration's new Secretary of Health and Human Services has publicly
criticized the shift to value-based care. See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, As Trump s HHS Secretary, Tom




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol17/iss1/1
REVISITING INCENTIVE-BASED CONTRACTS
It may be right to revisit the move to incentive pay. The history of incentive
pay across industries has been mixed. Scholars and policymakers have identified
a host of observed and potential mal-effects, from cherry picking easy cases or
cheating on the metrics, to excessively focusing on the metrics to the detriment of
overall quality of performance.9 The effectiveness of financial incentives in
motivating top performance is very much an unanswered question.
But it is a question that the literature on incomplete contracts can illuminate.
The issue of how to structure reimbursement agreements is really one of how to
draft contracts to maximize party performance. Economists, social scientists, and
contracts scholars have contributed to an immense literature addressing the
effects of contract drafting strategies on agents' cognition, compliance, and
motivation to perform.
This literature-theoretical, experimental, and empirical-is complicated,
and at times, seemingly conflicting. Financial incentives can motivate,io but can
also crowd out intrinsic motivation." Contract specificity can inform goals and
facilitate improved performance, while reducing the likelihood that parties will
use contractual gaps to justify unethical behavior.12 But specificity can also cause
agents to focus too narrowly and ignore hard cases, decreasing overall
performance, among a host of other identified effects.13
The literature suggests that the detailed, control-based contracting approach
is a better fit for easily measurable, compliance-oriented tasks not requiring
creativity or innovation than it is for more difficult-to-define tasks that require
motivating the agent's best performance. Experience with incentive-based
contracting across industries seems to bear out these predictions.
The health-care industry provides a new lens through which to study this
longstanding problem. There is an overtreatment problem in health care that has
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/11/29/as-trumps-hhs-secretary-tom-price-could-
slow-shift-to-value-based-care/#3b6187b0f96f [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-3XRS].
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See, e.g., Andrew M. Ryan & Rachel M. Werner, Doubts About Pay-for-Performance in
Health Care, HARV. Bus. REv. (Oct. 9, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/doubts-about-pay-for-
performance-in-health-care [https://perma.cc/J57E-W6GH]; infra Section II(A)(iii).
10. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 25 (1991) (finding
that incentive pay motivates hard work and directs allocation of attention among duties).
11. See Edward Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 105 (1971) (finding that college students will stop playing puzzles for
free after being paid to solve them); Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297 (2014) (summarizing the literature on crowd out effects); see generally
DANIEL PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US (2009) (arguing that
intrinsic motivation, rather than external rewards or punishments, is the biggest driver of high
performance in the workplace).
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variously been called an epidemic,14 one of our nation's most critical issues, and
a catastrophic force that increases the cost of health care.16 A recent study of
Medicare claims data found that in a single year, a whopping forty-two percent of
Medicare beneficiaries had received care known to provide minimal clinical
benefit.'7 According to the Institute of Medicine (IOM), overtreatment-too
many tests and too many procedures that do not improve health-is costing the
United States at least $210 billion per year.
Many believe that the traditional system of reimbursement in U.S. health
care encourages this overtreatment problem and therefore is highly problematic.19
Medicare, and most other payers in the United States, have historically paid
physicians on a fee-for-service basis. This means that physicians bill out for, and
receive compensation for, each service provided (such as office visits, tests, or
procedures). To maximize compensation, doctors must increase the volume of
care they provide or bill for more expensive services. Assuming physicians
behave as both rational and selfish economic actors, they are incentivized to
deliver high-volume, high-cost care. They lack financial incentive to stem
systemic costs or deliver high-quality care.2 0 Their incentives are mismatched
14. See Atul Gawande, Overkill: An Avalanche of Unnecessary Medical Care is Harming
Patients Physically and Financially. What Can We Do About It?, NEW YORIER (May 11, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11 /overkill-atul-gawande
[https://perma.cc/6CRA-QQAE] (discussing a "global epidemic of overtesting, overdiagnosis,
and overtreatment" caused by "[d]octors [who] get paid for doing more, not less"); see also Tara
Parker-Pope, Overtreatment is Taking a Harmful Toll, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/overtreatment-is-taking-a-harmful-toll
[https://perma.cc/2PZT-R59M].
15. Parker-Pope, supra note 14 (discussing how overtreatment "is costing the nation's health
care system at least $210 billion a year, according to the Institute of Medicine, and taking a human
toll in pain, emotional suffering, severe complications and even death").
16. Ezekiel J. Emanual & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Over-Utilization, 299 JAMA
2789 (2008) (discussing the "financial incentive for physicians to order and perform more
expensive procedures" as one factor in ballooning health-care costs).
17. Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA 1067
(2014).
18. INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH
CARE IN AMERICA 3-10 (Mark Smith, Robert Saunders, Leigh Stuckhardt & J. Michael McGinnis eds.,
2013); see also Annie Lowrey, Study of U.S. Health Care System Finds Both Waste and Opportunity
to Improve, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/health/policy/waste-
and-promise-seen-in-us-health-care-system.html [https://perma.cc/KX54-YFW8].
19. See generally Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45, 51-53 n.27 (2011) (summarizing the literature
on the connection-or lack thereof-between expenditures and outcomes in health care); Harold
Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009);
Rita Redberg & Judith Walsh, Pay Now, Benefits May Follow - The Case of Cardiac Computed
Tomographic Angiography, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2309 (2008) (arguing fee-for-service inflates
health costs); Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of
"Pay for Performance", 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 536 (2014) (summarizing the literature).
20. See generally sources cited supra note 19. There are, of course, altruistic reasons providers
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with those of payers preferring low-cost care and patients preferring high-quality
care-similar to the incentive mismatches that motivate the use of incentive pay
in other industries.
It is perhaps unsurprising that under the fee-for-service payment system, too
much care is being delivered in the United States that does not improve health
outcomes.21 This problem manifests in a health care system that is the most
expensive in the world, yet which suffers from lower overall quality than all
other industrialized nations.22
The general consensus in the industry is that physician financial incentives
23
must be addressed as a part of addressing overall cost and quality concerns. In
recent years, the industry has gotten behind the incentive-based compensation
solution.24 If the problem is that doctors' incentives are out of step with those of
payers and patients, then align their incentives; pay physicians for delivering
cost-effective, quality care, not for simply delivering more care.
Just as in other industries, the health-care commitment to incentive
compensation evidences a commitment to a more detailed contracting approach.
In a fee-for-service system, the contracts between physicians and payers are,
relatively speaking, unspecific and make only limited use of control elements,
such as reporting requirements and financial incentives tied to performance.
Although payers do generally only cover care that is deemed "medically
necessary,"25 and do exercise a good deal of control over the list of compensable
can influence the behavior of a significant percentage of physicians.
21. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 14; Emanuel & Fuchs, supra note 16, at 2790 (discussing
the fee-for-service incentive for overutilization).
22. See, e.g., Karen Davis et al., Mirror Mirror on the Wall, 2014 Update: How the
Performance of the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, COMMONWEALTH FUND 8,
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/fund-
report/2014/jun/1755_davis mirror mirror 2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUV2-78NF] (noting that
the United States ranks last in overall quality relative to 10 other industrialized nations); Emanuel
& Fuchs, supra note 21, at 2789 ("The United States spends substantially more per person on
health care than any other country, and yet US health outcomes are the same as or worse than those
in other cou[n]tries."). Note, however, that it is not necessarily clear that substandard care is the
cause of worse health outcomes. For a brief explanation of the potential importance of social
spending to health outcomes, see, for example, David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S. Health Care
from a Global Perspective: Spending, Use of Services, Prices, and Health in 13 Countries,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2015/oct/1819 _squiresushltcare global perspective oecd intlbrief_v3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DU58-PMDM].
23. It is worth noting, however, that despite this consensus, implementation of incentive pay is
slow to occur.
24. Incentive-based compensation and variants of it go by many names in the literature. See
infra note 30; see also Arnold Epstein, Paying for Performance in the United States and Abroad,
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 406, 406 (2006) ("Policymakers now almost universally agree that the
amplification and extension of the use of financial incentives will promote a higher quality of
care.").
25. See, e.g., What Part B Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-
covers/part-b/what-medicare-part-b-covers.html [https://perma.cc/UWD4-S3PS] [hereinafter What
7
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procedures, a fee-for-service approach gives physicians significant discretion in
how they approach care. Importantly, it commits to payment regardless of
outcome.
Incentive-based compensation, on the other hand, requires much more
detailed contract drafting. The payer provides, ex ante, a list of metrics the
physician is required to meet. The payer also defines the financial implications of
meeting, exceeding, or falling short of those metrics. If fee-for-service contracts
tend to be vague in task definition and tend to make limited use of control
elements, incentive pay is a move to the other end of the contract-drafting
spectrum: detailed task specification and extensive use of contractual control
mechanisms such as reporting, monitoring, and financial incentives.
The health-care industry has been focused on how to improve this new
payment model-for instance, how to determine the proper amount of the
financial incentive and how to choose the correct quality metrics. This Article
suggests that focus is misplaced. The key question the health-care industry
should be focused on solving is not how to improve this new payment model,
although that work may be useful, but rather on where and where not to use the
model. The legal, economic, and behavioral literature teaches that an across-the-
board approach such as the one currently being hailed in the industry will not be
effective. The industry must determine, and then implement, a more nuanced
approach that draws the line between tasks where incentive-pay mechanisms will
be helpful and those where they will be ineffective at best or harmful at worst.
Changing focus in this way is much more likely to yield successful results, even
if it requires recognizing that incentive-based compensation cannot solve all of
the health industry's problems.
This Article moves the debate forward by starting to sketch some ways the
industry might attempt to draw that line. For instance, the health-care industry
has massive amounts of data in its possession to help differentiate between the
two categories: where incentive pay should be used, and where it should not. It
could make better use of that data to target the application of incentive pay. And
the health profession has already started to draw some lines that might be helpful
to the incentive-pay context: for example, the line between the sort of work that
advanced practice providers, such as physicians' assistants, are statutorily
permitted to do versus the kind of work only doctors are permitted to do. The line
between care where process and outcomes are closely tied and where they are not
is also worth considering.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I starts by describing the incentive-
misalignment problem and how incentive pay is intended to work as a theoretical
matter. It then explains how incentive-based compensation is being applied in the
health-care context to address the physician-payer-patient incentive-
Part B Covers] ("Medicare covers services ... and supplies ... considered medically necessary to
treat a disease or condition."); see also Annotation, What Services, Equipment, or Supplies are
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misalignment problem and the Affordable Care Act's strong adoption of systemic
delivery model reform along these lines.
Because this switch in models is akin to a switch in contract-drafting
strategies, Part II surveys the scholarly literature discussing the effect of contract-
drafting strategies on agent performance. While there is much still to learn, this
literature yields some lessons and suggests some predictions about where a more
complete contract that relies on incentive-based compensation is likely to be
successful and where it is less likely to be so. It discusses the importance of
differentiating between contracts designed to prompt mere compliance and those
designed to motivate the strongest possible agent performance.
2 6
Part III then explores the evidence on the effectiveness of incentive-pay
regimes, first in the executive compensation, education, and sports industries, and
then the preliminary evidence in health care specifically. It suggests that the
experience across industries is accurately predicted by the scholarly literature
surveyed in Part II.
Finally, Part IV starts the discussion of how payers may refine this new
contracting approach in health care to yield more desirable results. The Article.
argues that the goals of improved quality and reduced cost cannot be
accomplished with a one-size-fits-all incentive-pay solution. Some areas of
medicine are compliance oriented and can be routinized or automated. Some.
areas cannot. This Article appreciates the distinction and uses it to define a
middle path for incentive pay. Differentiating between areas of medicine that
require compliance and those that require creativity and innovation is a difficult,
but not impossible, task.
I. THE INCENTIVE-MISALIGNMENT PROBLEM AND THE PREVAILING INCENTIVE-
PAY SOLUTION
A. The Incentive Pay Theory
Incentive-based compensation has its roots in agency theory.27 An agency
relationship is formed when a principal hires an agent to perform a task on the
principal's behalf. The agent and the principal have varying personal interests.
The agent's self-interest may cause her to engage in behavior that benefits the
26. Oliver Hart and John Moore famously differentiate between perfunctory and consummate
performance. For example, if a contract specifies the number of jokes a comedienne must tell, a
perfunctory performance will do strictly that-comply with those requirements. A comedienne
delivering consummate performance, however, will go for the big laughs, even though the contract
does not specify how funny her jokes must be. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as
Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON 1, 6 (2008).
27. Wendy Netter Epstein, Public-Private Contracting and the Reciprocity Norm, 64 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 16-17 (2014) (describing agency theory and incentive alignment); Hamid Mehran,
Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. EcoN. 162, 165-
67 (1995) (discussing the application of agency theory in modem executive compensation models).
9
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agent but harms the principal. Problems arise, in particular, when the agent has
better information about her performance than the principal-information
asymmetry-and when the principal (or the market) cannot easily monitor the
agent.
In the classic depiction, aligning the incentives of the principal and agent can
mitigate agency problems. For instance, the interests of shareholders and the
corporation's CEO may diverge in that shareholders want the CEO to increase
company profitability and stock price, but the CEO may be motivated to make
choices that will benefit the CEO personally-say empire building by acquiring
companies to increase the CEO's power-that are not necessarily in the best
interests of the corporation.28 To align incentives, shareholders may tie a CEO's
bonus to stock price or profitability or give the CEO equity in the company.
The theory is appealing: tie compensation to the results you want. An
economically rational, self-interested agent will be motivated by the prospect of
increasing compensation and will act accordingly.2 9
Within those general parameters, the idea of aligning incentives through
compensation takes many forms and goes by many names in the literature,
including pay-for-performance, merit (or performance) pay, differentiated pay,
performance measures, incentive or value-based compensation, to name some.30
But the idea is always to specify, ex ante, the desired outcomes and the financial
reward (or punishment) for attaining the desired goals,31 and to ensure that the
desired outcomes are readily observable, or that goal attainment can otherwise be
32assessed by monitoring or reporting. A rational agent seeking to maximize
28. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 16 (2004);
Andrew C. W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive
Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 736 (2011); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much
Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 685 (2005); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1244 (2004).
29. Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures ofPublic-Private Contracting, 34
CARDOzo L. REV. 2211, 2233-34 (2013); Sarah Bonner & Geoffrey Sprinkle, The Effects of
Monetary Incentives on Effort and Task Performance: Theories, Evidence, and a Framework for
Research, 27 ACCT. ORGS. Soc'Y 303, 308 (2002).
30. Pay for Performance in Health Care: Methods and Approaches, RTI INT'L 2 (Jerry
Cromwell et al. eds., 2011), https://www.rti.org/sites/default/files/resources/bk-0002-l103-
mitchell.pdf [https://perma.cc/MER5-UXNF] (discussing performance measures and value-based
pay); id. at 33 (defining pay-for-performance); id at 88 (discussing merit pay). CMS defines pay-
for-performance as the "use of payment methods and other incentives to encourage quality
improvement and patient-focused high value care." Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director, Ctr. for
Medicaid & State Operations, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to State Health Officials
(Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/SH0040606.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YH2E-RPQW].
31. See Stout, supra note 19, at 531-32 ("Ex ante agreement to an objective performance goal
is essential... .").
32. KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION, CONTRACTING
AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 37 (1995) (describing how principals invoke reporting
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compensation, in theory, will then make every effort to achieve the defined goals.
B. Misaligned Incentives in Health Care
As in other industries, the U.S. health-care industry has problems with
misaligned incentives. Health care's traditional fee-for-service compensation
model is, in part, to blame. Fee for service means that providers bill and receive
payment for each service (e.g., an office visit or procedure) they perform.
Compensation can influence the behavior of a significant percentage of
providers.33 A rational provider seeking to increase reimbursement under the
current fee-for-service system may choose to bill for more expensive, higher-
margin procedures.34 Alternatively, a provider may choose to bill for a higher
volume of procedures from treating more patients or from ordering that more be
done for existing patients.3 5
The fee-for-service compensation system creates an incentive mismatch
between payers and providers, and to an extent, patients, as well.
36 Payers would
prefer for providers to deliver lower cost care. Patients prefer higher-quality.
care. Providers are incentivized, in a strict economic sense, to provide higher-cost,
care that is not necessarily linked to higher-quality care. This creates a principal-
agent problem. Providers as agents have a certain degree of power to make
decisions that impact payers as principals. The problem is created when the
physician-agent is motivated to act in ways that further his or her own financial
self interest, rather than those of the payer-principal.
Providers cannot engage in strictly self-interested, profit-maximizing
behaviors alone. Patients must consent to tests and procedures.38 Payers must also
33. See J. Tufano et al., Effects of Compensation Models on Physician Behaviors, 7 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE 363 (2001) (finding that compensation method is perceived to influence physician
productivity); see also David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives.
Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory Care Center, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1059, 1059-1063
(1990); Alan Hillman, Mark Pauly & Joseph Kerstein, How Do Financial Incentives Affect
Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 88-91 (1989) (concluding that financial incentives
influence physician behavior).
34. See David Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay for: Result-Based
Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1427, 1442 (2001) (noting that FFS
compensation "encourages providers to be exhaustive in work-ups and treatments," and to upcode
and deliver unnecessary services).
35. See Candeub, supra note 19, at 45-47.
36. See Ake Blomqvist, The Doctor as Double Agent: Information Asymmetry, Health
Insurance, and Medical Care, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 411, 412 (1991); Hyman & Silver, supra note
34, at 1442-43; see generally Stanley S. Wallack & Christopher P. Tompkins, Realigning Incentives
in Fee-For-Service Medicare, 22 HEALTH AFF. 59 (2001) (discussing the incentive mismatch in fee-
for-service Medicare).
37. See Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis,
22 HEALTH AFF. 17 (2003).
38. See Paul Appelbaum, Assessment to Patients' Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1834 (2007) ("Physicians are required by law and medical ethics to obtain the
11
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agree to pay. And physicians are limited by the fraud and abuse and tort laws in
what they can do to pursue heightened personal compensation.39
But providers have a lot of power. Most patients lack effective means to
evaluate a provider's advice on what testing or procedures are necessary.40 And
most patients do not sufficiently care about incurring the cost of additional
procedures because they do not experience the true cost.41 Most patients pay only
small (relatively speaking) copays or a low percentage of the total cost of the
42procedure. Some patients may make decisions based on cost. For others, cost
may not be a highly salient part of the decision calculus.4 3 As such, providers are
positioned to greatly influence treatment decisions simply by their advice to
44patients.
As to payers, most only cover "medically necessary" procedures.45 And
payers negotiate (or sometimes flat out set) rates of reimbursement, which can
affect provider incentive structures. But there is no central rationing of care in the
46U.S. system. Even payers can only do so much to impact provider incentives.
The bottom line is that fee-for-service systems incentivize providers to
suggest more care-and more expensive care-which drive up health costs in
ways that do not necessarily improve quality. Many believe that this incentive
informed consent of their patients before initiating treatment.").
39. This explanation admittedly focuses only on the purely economic drivers of physician
actions. In reality, physicians may act altruistically or their behavior may be influenced by
professional and social norms more generally.
40. See, e.g., Hyman & Silver, supra note 34, at 1445 ("Individual patients frequently have
difficulty assessing quality of care."); Matthew P. Manary et al., The Patient Experience and Health
Outcomes, 368 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201 (2013); Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-
Making, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
41. See Peter Zweifel & Willard G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in
Health Care, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH EcoNoMics 409, 451-54 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P.
Newhouse eds., 2000); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Paying 711 it Hurts -A Case Study in High Costs, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-
leads-the-world-in-health-expenditures.html [https://perma.cc/69DR-3MSA]. With the consumer-
based, health-care movement urging more patient out-of-pocket expenditures, however, this may be
changing. See also Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health
Care (forthcoming).
42. The payer foots the bill for the rest. Rosenthal, supra note 41 ("Patients with insurance pay
a tiny fraction of the bill, providing scant disincentive for spending."). A typical PPO plan costs the
consumer twenty percent coinsurance.
43. Rosenthal, supra note 41.
44. Epstein, supra note 40; see also Candeub, supra note 19 at 47 n.9 ("The physician-induced-
demand hypothesis posits that physicians take advantage of patients' ignorance by recommending
treatment that they may not need, thus 'inducing' demand for medical services.") (citing Rune J.
Sorensen & Jostein Grytten, Competition and Supplier-Induced Demand in a Health Care System
with Fixed Fees, 8 HEALTH ECON. 497, 497 (1999)).
45. See What Part B Covers, supra note 25; Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We
NeedIt?, 14 HEALTH AFF. 180, 188 (1995).
46. See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html [https://perma.cc/ZF7F-47YY]
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structure has at least in part created the overtreatment problem we face in the
United States.47 In fact, unnecessary tests and procedures not only increase cost,
48
but may also harm patients.49
Policymakers and lawmakers have, in recent years, turned their focus to
addressing this incentive mismatch. Health-care costs in the United States are
unbearably high, while key indicators of quality are disappointingly low when
compared to peer nations.50 Although most health economists agree that a
combination of factors is to blame, the incentive mismatch encourages
overtreatment, which drives up costs and does not necessarily improve quality.5 I
Many view this problem as low-hanging fruit that can be solved by aligning
the incentives of providerS52 with those of payers and patients.53 The next subpart
discusses the incentive-compensation model in health care.
C. The Health Industry's Incentive-Pay Solution
Linking payment with desired results has been touted by members of
Congress as the panacea for health care that can save the United States $700.
billion a year, while simultaneously improving quality.54 The following explains.
47. See, e.g., Gawande, supra note 14; Peter R. Orszag, Health Costs Are the Real Deficit
Threat, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2009, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124234365947221489 [https://perma.cc/EAX2-UJBPD].
48. Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1067 (July 2014).
49. Gawande, supra note 14.
50. 155 CONG. REC. S11132-05 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hagan) ("[T]he
United States spends $2.3 trillion each year on health care - the most per capita of all industrialized
nations. Yet we still have higher infant mortality and lower life expectancy than many of the other
industrialized nations."). Some have argued that health-care costs more in the U.S. because we are a
wealthier country and are buying better quality, but data should disabuse us of that notion. See
Candeub, supra note 19 at 51 (2011) ("There is little to no data linking total health care
expenditures with positive health care outcomes.").
51. See, e.g., The High Costs of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/opinion/
2 5sun I.html [https://perma.cc/D48J-T2VY] (detailing
various causes of the high cost-low quality health-care problem); Julie Appleby, Seven Factors
Driving Up Your Health Care Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://khn.org/news/health-care-costs [https://perma.cc/749T-C2AN] (describing the roles providers
and consumers have in driving up health-care costs).
52. The term "provider" has many definitions in the literature and in the statutes. Here, I define
it as a person who delivers health-care services. For the most part, this will mean physicians, but
particularly as I start to flesh out solutions in Part IV, I use the term more broadly to cover
advanced practice practitioners, as well. See Part IV(B), infra. I do not mean "provider" to include
hospitals and other such entities.
53. See, e.g., Report of The National Commission on Physician Payment Reform, NAT'L
COMMISsION ON PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM 15 (2013), http://physicianpaymentcommission.org
/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/physicianpayment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LB8-329V]
[hereinafter Physician Payment Reform] (finding provider compensation as a main driver of health-
care costs and recommending a blended payment system to reduce costs).
54. 155 CONG. REC. S11132 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hagan).
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how incentive-based compensation is expected to work.
In the health context specifically, the typical pay-for-performance program
provides a bonus to health-care providers (or hospitals or other medical entities)55
if they meet or exceed agreed-upon metrics, although some are structured to
penalize providers that fail to meet defined metrics. Programs may also reward
improvement in metrics over time.
Quality and performance measures differ by program, but generally fall into
four categories: process, outcome, patient experience, or structure. Process
metrics require providers to follow a predefined process to satisfy the metric,
such as giving aspirin to heart-attack victims within a certain amount of time
after the patient arrives in the emergency room. Outcome measures focus on
results. Morbidity and mortality data are the classic examples. More recently,
there has been a focus on defining more-specific outcome measures, such as
58reductions in hemoglobin Alc in diabetic patients. Patient experience measures
the patients' perception of the care they receive and is usually collected by
compiling the results of patient surveys. Finally, structure considers the inputs
into health-care provision, from the facilities and equipment used in treatment, to
the adoption of health information technology. Incentive pay in the health-care
setting may be predicated on any one category of metrics or, more commonly, a
combination of several.
The Institute of Medicine's (IOM) 2001 study on the quality of health care
in the United States is generally credited for prompting the incentive-pay
movement, both for government and private payers. The report defined the
problem: "Health care harms patients too frequently and routinely fails to deliver
its potential benefits. Indeed, between the health care that we now have and the
health care that we could have lies not just a gap, but a chasm."59 It then
suggested that one way to narrow that chasm was to "align[] payment policies
with quality improvement."60 Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which
55. This Article focuses on financial incentives for providers, although the industry move to
value-based compensation captures a much larger set of players that future work should address.




58. Id. Hemoglobin Alc is "a common blood test used to diagnose type I and type 2
diabetes and then to gauge how well [an individual is] managing [his] diabetes.... The A1C test
results reflects [the] average blood sugar level. . . . The higher [the] AIC level, the poorer [the]
blood sugar control and the higher [the] risk of diabetes complications." AlC Test Overview,
MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/alc-test/home/ovc-
20167930 [https://perma.cc/BLB5-7P2G].
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were suffering under the appearance that they cut cost at the sacrifice of quality,
particularly heeded the call.
1. Early Experiments in Paying for Quality in Health Care
a. Health Maintenance Organizations
HMOs initially came about as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service
system, primarily designed to contain skyrocketing health-care costs.6 HMOs
typically offered flat-fee payment (capitation).62 Salary holdbacks designed to
ensure that physicians reduced costs were also common.63 If fee for service
encouraged providers to bill for more volume, HMOs encouraged providers to
offer the least service possible in order to maximize provider profits.
By most accounts, capitation successfully incentivized providers to reduce
costs to payers relative to the fee-for-service model.64 The problem is that
insufficient attention was paid to quality.65 Market wide, this made HMOs fall
out of favor with patients who came to associate them with rationing care.66
Following the IOM report, many HMOs, some of which had already been.
experimenting with pay for performance, quickly jumped on board the incentive-
pay movement.67 At the state level, California HMOs were early adopters.
68
early 2000, the Integrated Healthcare Association was formed to establish a
statewide set of key measures on which health plans could base incentive
61. See, e.g., Arnold J. Rosoff, The Federal HMO Assistance Act: Helping Hand or Hurdle?,
13 AM. Bus. L.J., 137, 137-39; see also Jennifer Evans & Jaclyn Schiff, A Timeline ofKennedy's
Health Care Achievements and Disappointments, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://khn.org/news/kennedy-health-care-timeline [https://perma.cc/3RNE-9RZP].
62. Capitation Models, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
http://www.hei3.org/thought-Ieadership/why-incentives-matter/capitation/capitation-models
[https://perma.cc/3YXY-23WP].
63. HMOs held back a percentage of physician salary. At the end of the year, if treatment costs
were within target ranges, the HMO would pay out the physician the hold back amount, but if costs
exceeded targets, the HMO would retain the holdback amount. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow,
Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419 (1997).
64. See, e.g., Harold Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28
HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/1418.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH8U-GL9W].
65. Id. There was some early experimentation with accounting for quality in pay. For instance,
in 1987, U.S. Healthcare introduced quality-based compensation for primary care physicians and
created the Quality Care Compensation System (QCCS). Nicholas Hanchak et al., U.S.
Healthcare 's Quality-Based Compensation Model, 17 HEALTH CARE F[NANCING REv. 143 (1996).
66. Richard Friedenberg, Health Care Rationing: Every Physician's Dilemma, 217 RADIOLOGY
626 (2000).
67. See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Pay for Performance in Commercial HMOs, 355 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1895 (2006).
68. Integrated Healthcare Association, Advancing Quality Through Collaboration: The
California Pay for Performance Program, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 455, 457-59 (2006).
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payments.69 Since then, California health plans have done just that. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Massachusetts is doing something similar with their Alternative
Quality Contract (AQC). 70 HMO-level use of incentive pay has also been spurred
by a couple of programs with larger scope, such as the Leapfrog Group,7' and
Bridges to Excellence.7 2
In 2005, a nationwide study of commercial HMOs found that more than half
were using incentive-pay programs in their contracts with providers.73 The most
common metrics used were process-oriented metrics (e.g., use of mammography,
asthma medication, etc.). Measures of patient satisfaction were also popular.
HMOs were a logical site of first experimentation because they required
beneficiaries to select a primary-care physician, who could then be responsible
for the overall quality (and quantity) of care the patient received.74 HMOs were
also more motivated than other delivery models to respond to criticisms about
quality.75
b. Early Government Experiments
The IOM report also prompted the government to experiment with incentive
pay. In the Medicare context, the Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP)
Demonstration was the primary pilot program. It began in April 2005, and was
designed to be a hybrid between fee-for-service and capitation models in the
sense that physician groups were initially paid on a fee-for-service basis, but
were eligible for bonuses equal to the percentage of savings in Medicare
expenditures that the physician groups generated for their patients.76 CMS
69. Id. at 455-56 (2006).
70. James, supra note 56. Other examples of private initiatives include Humana's Provider
Quality Rewards program, United Healthcare's program in Illinois, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Minnesota's provider contracts, and HealthPartners programs in the upper Midwest. Adria
Schmedthorst, Commercial Payers and Value-Based Reimbursement, Go PRACTICE BLOG (Mar. 30,
2016), http://gopractice.kareo.com/article/commercial-payers-and-value-based-reimbursement
[https://perma.cc/7BHV-M3GX].
71. The Leapfrog Group is a nationwide group of health-care purchasers (employers) that
encourages public reporting of health-care quality and outcomes and rewarding doctors and
hospitals for improving quality and cost metrics. In 2005, it initiated a hospital-focused program
that tied improvement in five clinical areas to financial incentives. Robert S. Galvin et al., Has the
Leapfrog Group Had an Impact on the Health Care Market, 24 HEALTH AFF. 228, 229-30 (2005).
72. Bridges to Excellence is a multi-state, multi-employer organization that operates reward
programs created to encourage improvements in the quality of care. Bridges to Excellence, HEALTH
CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INSTITUTE, http://www.hei3.org/programs-efforts/bridges-to-
excellence [https://perma.ccJNZ7E-NFKZ].
73. Rosenthal et al., supra note 67 at 1895.
74. Id at 1901 ("Several characteristics of HMOs were associated with the use of pay for
performance, including ... role of the PCP . . . .").
75. Neelam K. Sekhri, Managed Care: The US Experience, 78 WHO BULLETIN 830, 830, 838-
39 (2000) (noting managed health care faced much backlash in response to limited provider
compensation, rationed care, and subpar quality of care).
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calculated savings by comparison with the expenditures of a local "control"
group not participating in the demonstration project. In addition, physician
groups were eligible to retain a higher percentage of savings if they demonstrated
strong performance on certain quality metrics. The pilot ran from 2005 through
2010, with the addition of a transition demonstration that ran from January 2011
through December 2012.77 By 2010, the participating physician groups reached
"benchmark performance on at least 30 of the 32" quality metrics.78 Further, the
physician groups "received performance payments totaling $29.4 million as their
share of the $36.2 million of [the] savings generated."7 9
This early government experimentation fueled the desire to implement
incentive compensation in a more global and systematic manner.
2. The Affordable Care Act's Commitment o Incentive-Based Compensation
Despite the contentious political debates that surrounded and continue to
surround the Affordable Care Act (ACA), there was strong bipartisan support for
a key category of reform reflected in the bill: restructuring the Medicare delivery
system by tying financial incentives to performance.80 The Institute of Medicine
has estimated that the United States could save $750 billion a year by changing
(Oct. 20, 2016), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/physician-group-practice-transition
[https://perma.cc/T5K3-24F8]; Wallack & Tompkins, supra note 36. This pilot was an early
experiment in what later became the Medicare Shared Savings Program. Shared Savings Program,
CTRS MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/GJF7-NB7Y].
77. At the state level, Medicaid also did some early experimentation with incentive-based
provider payments. A study published in 2007 by the Commonwealth Fund surveyed state
Medicaid programs and found that over half of all states were using programs that relied on
incentive-based compensation in at least some respect. See Kathryn Kuhmerker & Thomas Hartman,
Pay-for-Performance in State Medicaid Programs: A Survey of State Medicaid Directors and Programs,
COMMONWEALTH FUND (2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/fund-
report/2007/apr/pay-for-performance-in-state-medicaid-programs-a-survey-of-state-medicaid-directors-
and-programs/101 8_kuhmerker payforperformance statemedicaidprogs v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JTK7-TEU8]. The final results of the Medicare Physician Group Practice
Demonstration can be found at Evaluation of the Medicare Physician Group Practice
Demonstration Final Report, CTRS. MEDICARE. & MEDICAID (Sept. 2012),
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/Reports/PGPFinalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TU3-FY7M]
[hereinafter Physician Group Practice].
78. Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration: Physician Groups Continue to
Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance
Demonstration, CTRS MEDICARE & MEDICAID 5 (July 2011), https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/fact-
sheet/PGP-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T36K-3HZ2] [hereinafter PGP Demonstration]; see
also Physician Group Practice, supra note 77, at 141 ("Given these findings, we believe the
observed differences (i.e., larger improvements by the PGPs) were beyond random chance, and that
the Demonstration had a positive effects on the quality of care delivered by the participating
PGPs.").
79. PGP Demonstration, supra note 78 at 5.
80. Candeub, supra note 19 at 54.
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the provider compensation approach.81 By some measures, the ACA includes
forty five different provisions aimed at reforming health-care delivery to either
improve the quality and/or the efficiency of health care in some way.82 Common
amongst all of these new ACA initiatives, however, is the measurement of
quality by attainment of process or outcome goals and cost savings, and the
provision of a financial reward based on those metrics. What differs is the target,
mechanism of administration, size of the incentive, and measures used to
determine payments.83 The three largest initiatives are: (1) the establishment of a
Shared Savings Program to benefit Accountable Care Organizations; (2) the new
incentive-based compensation model for physicians (and hospitals); and (3) a
pilot program to test bundled payments, among other initiatives.84
a. Accountable Care Organizations
Of all the provisions aimed at reforming the delivery model by aligning
incentives, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have received the most
attention. Section 3022 of the ACA requires the Secretary to establish a Medicare
Shared Savings Program under which eligible doctors, hospitals, and other
81. See Synopsis and Overview, INST. OF MED., The Healthcare Imperative: Lowering Costs
and Improving Outcomes 2 (Pierre L. Yong et al. eds., 2011); see also 159 CONG. REc. S16057
(daily ed. Jul. 13, 2013) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) ("The President's Council of Economic
Advisers has estimated that we could save approximately $700 billion . . . The Institute of Medicine
took a look at the same question. They put the savings number at $750 billion."); Candeub, supra
note 19 at 46-47 ("The belief that health care provision is wracked with inefficiency motivated ...
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act . .. and The Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act . .. with the White House acknowledging the elimination of this $700 billion
waste as a chief goal.").
82. See, e.g., Pay for Performance, U.S. HEALTH POLICY GATEWAY (Dana Beezely-Smith
ed., 2015), http://ushealthpolicygateway.com/payer-trade-groups/qualitysatisfaction/quality-
improvement/general-approaches/pay-for-performance [ttps://perma.cc/CF6M-H7TC]. This
does not include, for instance, the recent enactment of the Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 and its expansion of value-based payment systems for providers.
See Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a
comprehensive summary of MACRA, see JIM HAHN & KIRSTIN B. BLOM, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43962, THE MEDICARE ACCESS AND CHIP REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2015 (2015).
83. See, e.g., Ateev Mehrotra et al., Using the Lessons of Behavioral Economics to Design
More Effective Pay-for-Performance Programs, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 497 (2010); Brian M.
Stecher et al., Toward a Culture of Consequences: Performance-Based Accountability Systems for
Public Services, RAND CORP. (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs
/201 O/RAND_MG1019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YVP-LWAP].
84. These are three of the major provisions, but overall, the ACA, by some counts, reflects
these goals in 45 different provisions. Major Affordable Care Act Delivery and Payment
Reforms, AM. PUB. HEALTH Ass'N (Oct. 2013), https://www.apha.org/-/media
/files/pdf/topics/aca/deliveryreforms_table_aphaoct2013.ashx [https://perma.cc/QQ33-
HTJA]; see also Candeub, supra note 19 at 51 (2011). These mechanisms span many actors in
the health-care system. In the text, the main focus is on the incentives at the provider level,
although because some of the programs are collaboration based, it is not possible to entirely isolate
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providers receive financial bonuses relating to the cost savings they achieve for
Medicare, assuming certain predefined quality metrics are also met.
5 To
participate in the Shared Savings Program, eligible entities must create or
86
participate in an ACO. An ACO is a network of care providers committed to
improving quality and reducing cost through coordination of efforts. Rather than
individual specialists treating one patient without collaboration (thus duplicating
tests and procedures, and lacking a cohesive view of the entire patient), ACOs
deliver integrated care enabled by shared medical records and other coordination.
In theory, ACOs avoid duplication of services and prevent medical errors. By
giving providers who have at least some control over cost and quality of care a
bonus for cost and quality metrics improvement (and in some cases a penalty for
failing to meet goals), the ACO model aligns provider incentives with
*87
governmental priorities.
Both cost savings and quality metrics play a part in determining ACO
compensation. First, CMS sets a benchmark of average Medicare expenditures,
taking into account a projected growth rate in expenses. CMS also sets a list of
quality metrics and associated benchmarks.88 The thirty-three measures span four-
quality domains: (1) Patient/Caregiver Experience; (2) Care Coordination/Patient
Safety; (3) Preventive Health; and (4) At-Risk Population.89 Seven measures are
assessed from survey data, three are calculated via claims, one is calculated from -
Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program data,
and twenty two are collected by reporting mechanisms.90
ACOs receive points on a sliding scale based on level of performance
relative to the benchmarks. For instance, ACOs must report on certain preventive
health measures administered to patients, such as immunizations for influenza
and mammography screenings. ACOs must also report outcome measures for
patients with various illnesses. For example, for patients with diabetes, ACOs
must document control of Hemoglobin Alc, and for patients with hypertension,
ACOs must report on patient blood pressure. ACOs that do well on these
measures can earn a Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) incentive.
The quality metrics differentiate ACOs from HMOs and, in theory, prevent
85. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012);
see infra note 89 for further information on the quality metrics.
86. See 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016).
87. Finalized Changes to the Medicare Shared Savings Program Regulations, CTRS. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (June 4, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-
sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-06-04.html [https://perma.cc/9E63-K9SH] [hereinafter CMS
Medicare Shared Savings Fact Sheet].
8 8. Id.
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ACOs from saving money by rationing necessary care.9 i Ultimately, CMS
compares actual expenditures at term end to the benchmark, and then factors in
performance on the quality metrics to assess shared savings (or potential shared
losses).
According to CMS, ACOs serve nearly nine million Americans with
92Medicare, and Medicare is continuing to aggressively expand the program. In
January 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) publicly
announced a goal of tying fifty percent of payments to alternative payment
models, such as ACOs, by the end of 2018.93
b. Incentive-Based Compensation for Physicians
The ACA also changes the method of physician payment through the
Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier. 94 The program applies to traditional
fee-for-service Medicare reimbursement where physicians are currently paid
according to a fee schedule. The modifier adjusts fees paid to physicians using
data reported on quality and resource use. In other words, physician payments are
modified to reflect the value of care they provide.95 It is intended to work in the
same manner as traditional incentive pay: the government pays physicians more
91. Whether this distinction will ultimately play out as intended, however, is a matter of
continuing debate. Consider, for instance, recent findings of implicit rationing in centralized health
systems such as the Veterans Health Administration and the National Health Service. See, e.g.,
Nancy M. Schlichting et al., Commission on Care: Final Report, COMMISSION ON CARE (Jun. 30,
2016), https://commissiononcare.sites.usa.gov/files/2016/07/Commission-on-CareFinal-
Report 063016_FOR-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT8U-728V]; Richard Vize, Rationing Care is a
Fact of Life for the NHS, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-
network/2015/apr/24/rationing-care-fact-of-life-nhs [https://perma.cc/LG5B-BBAH].
92. See S. Lawrence Kocot & Ross White, Medicare ACOs: Incremental Progress, But Performance
Varies, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Sept. 21, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/09/21/medicare-acos-
incremental-progress-but-performance-vaies [https://perma.cc/N4VR-W94Z] ("[N]early 9 million
Medicare beneficiaries [are] attributed to the Medicare ACO programs ... ."). This number has steadily
increased from 7.8 million in 2015, see David Muhlestein, Growth and Dispersion ofAccountable
Care Organizations in 2015, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-and-dispersion-of-accountable-care-organizations-
in-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/2TDK-NQQS], and 5.6 million in 2014, see Press Release, Ctrs. for
Medicaid and Medicare Servs., Medicare ACOs Continue to Succeed in Improving Care, Lowering
Cost Growth (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-
sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-11 0.html [https://perma.cc/9N3A-EYHL].
93. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter, Healthier: In Historic
Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from
Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/01/26/better-smarter-healthier-
in-historic-announcement-hhs-sets-clear-goals-and-timeline-for-shifting-medicare-reimbursements-
from-volume-to-value.html [https://perma.cc/6JVT-GSAA]. It is unclear whether the Trump
Administration will still seek to satisfy this goal.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2012).
95. Medicare FFS Physician Feedback Program/Value-Based Payment Modifier, CTRS.
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if physicians do what the government wants them to do.
96
The program started by focusing on measures of clinical processes and
results of patient-satisfaction surveys, but over time has come to rely more
heavily on outcome measures, such as mortality rates, rather than measures of
process compliance.97
This new adjustment was first applied in 2015 to group practices with one
hundred or more eligible professionals, using quality reporting data from 2013.
The program will be scaled up to apply to all physicians by 2018. The program
is budget neutral for the government; therefore, some physicians will see their
pay increase while others will see it decrease.99
c. Bundled Payments
Finally, Section 3023 of the ACA establishes a five-year program to test
bundled payments.100 Bundled payments mean that rather than paying per
procedure or per test, reimbursement will be based on the expected costs for an
entire episode of care (e.g., a single illness or course of treatment).1
0 1 The
payment arrangement includes both cost and quality components to assess value-
provided for the episode of care. The idea is, if a predefined sum of money will
be awarded for patient care and total reimbursement cannot be increased by
ordering more tests or procedures, providers will think hard about whether that
extra test is likely to yield valuable information before ordering it and will
coordinate their efforts to avoid costly and unnecessary duplication.
A number of models are currently being piloted.102 Recently, Secretary of
96. Section 3001 of the ACA establishes the Hospital (In-Patient) Value-Based Purchasing
Program, which works based on a similar mechanism. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(1)(A) (2012).
97. See id. (explaining that CMS adjusts payments to hospitals based on how well a hospital
performs based on four domains, and how much the hospital improves on those domains).
98. Initially the program was intended to apply to physicians by 2017, see Value-Based
Payment Modifier and the Physician Feedback Program, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/
20 11-Fact-
sheets-items/2011-11-01-6.html [https://perma.cc/23PV-SVEE], but now it will apply to




99. See Summary of2015 Physician Value-based Payment Modifier Policies, CTRS. MEDICARE




100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012).
101. Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/
2 0 13-Fact-
sheets-items/2013-01-31.html [https://perma.cc/SC5E-45BJ].
102. See, e.g., National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012);
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative (BPCI) Fact Sheet, CTRS. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-
21
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Health and Human Services Sylvia M. Burwell announced a pilot of bundled
payments for hip- and knee-replacement procedures. The Secretary stated:
By focusing on episodes of care, rather than a piecemeal system,
hospitals and physicians have an incentive to work together to deliver
more effective and efficient care. This model will incentivize providing
patients with the right care the first time and finding better ways to help
them recover successfully.03
The financial incentive in this model flows directly to the hospital and not the
physician, although physician behavior is intended to be targeted as well. 10 4
The next Part discusses why these new approaches really indicate a shift in
contract drafting strategy and surveys the relevant literature.
II. THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACT DRAFTING STRATEGIES ON PARTY
PERFORMANCE
For decades, scholars across disciplines have studied the effects of
contracting strategies on party performance. Because the shift from fee-for-
service to incentive compensation is a shift in contract-drafting strategy, this
literature yields important, yet understudied, lessons for the health industry.
sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-08-13-2.html [https://perma.cc/99Q8-2XCZ]; Comprehensive
Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Program, 42 C.F.R. § 510.1; Oncology Care Model, CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/oncology-care
[https://perma.cc/B7N3-NFKN].
103. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., CMS Proposes Major Initiative for
Hip and Knee Replacements (July 9, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/07/09/cms-
proposes-major-initiative-for-hip-and-knee-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/DRV4-3YW9]; see
also Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., Medicare's Delivery System Reform
Initiatives Achieve Significant Savings and Quality Improvements - Off to a Strong Start (Jan. 30,
2014), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-Releases/2014-Press-
releases-items/2014-01-30.html [https://perma.cc/TR9J-N5FJ]. For a review of the four models of
bundled payments under the Bundled Payments for Care Initiative, see Bundled Payments for
Care Improvement Initiative (BPCI), CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments [https://perma.cc/QZ72-FLL8]
[hereinafter BCPI].
104. With increasing numbers of physicians being employed by hospitals, the question is
whether hospitals are passing incentives down to physicians. A thorough review of that question is
outside the scope of this paper, but there is at least some evidence that the trend is for hospitals to
structure physician employment contracts to have both a salary portion and an incentive-based
portion, such that ultimately both the hospital itself and the individual physicians have financial
incentives to provide higher-quality medical care. See, e.g., Gerard F. Anderson et al., Medicare
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A. History and Background on the Incomplete-Contracts Literature
Historically, contracts were thought to exist on a spectrum ranging from less
complete to more complete. At one end of the spectrum was a perfectly complete
contingent contract specifying the rights and duties of all parties in every possible
state of the world.10 5 At the other end of the spectrum was a rather vague
agreement hat might be so indefinite as not to be enforceable by a court.
106
The literature on contract-drafting strategy initially focused on the choice to
draft a relatively more-complete or a relatively less-complete contract.10 But
scholarly attention eventually turned to the question of the impact of contract
form on party performance. In other words, once the choice to draft a rather-
more-complete or a rather-less-complete contract has been made, does that
choice affect the success of the deal?
Law and economics scholars posited that less-complete contracts would be
more likely to result in litigation because failure to give adequate guidance to the
parties about their duties and obligations would be more likely to lead to the
breakdown of a deal.'0 8 A less-complete contract would tend to yield
opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, more-complete contracts were thought
to be less likely to result in litigation because the parties were clear in their
contractual obligations. 109
In recent decades, there have been two major shifts in this conversation. The
first shift grew out of work in the behavioral sciences. The law and economics
account of incomplete contracts assumed parties acted both rationally and
selfishly. But experiments started to show that individual behavior often deviated
from these predictions."0 In a quest to understand these behavioral anomalies, a
much broader literature that built upon the law and economics model, but that
also considered the impact of these new findings, began to emerge.
In particular, this work acknowledges that drafting choices can affect both an
105. An entirely complete contract is merely a theoretical construct. No contract could ever be
entirely complete. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory ofSelf-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1641 (2003).
106. See id. at 1643-644 (describing how courts dismiss claims of breach due to a contract's
indefiniteness).
107. See Oliver Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 177, 197 (1985)
(analyzing possible solutions for limiting litigation in the face of incomplete contracts); see also
Ronald Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT'L ECON. REv. 233 (1985) (discussing the
conflict between costs and benefits regarding completeness in contracts).
108. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1581 (2005) (discussing the potential costs of litigation arising from an incomplete
contract).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980).
23
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agent's compliance and the agent's motivation."' Compliance describes the
desire for an agent to execute the precise task that the principal has defined.
Compliance requires that the agent understand the task the principal is asking the
agent to undertake (cognition), and has the ability to do the work.1 12 Motivation,
on the other hand, describes how much effort the agent puts into the task. A
talented agent may not need to try very hard to achieve compliance. But in many
circumstances, the principal might want to get more than mere compliance from
the agent. The principal might want to get the best possible performance that
goes above and beyond the minimum requirements of the contract.
The second shift reflected the realization that contracts are not as one
dimensional as the spectrum from less complete to more complete had suggested.
Rather, there are many dimensions in which a contract may be "complete" or
"incomplete," and those different dimensions may have differing impacts on
party performance."1 3
For instance, a contract may define the agent's required tasks and
performance goals in either a more-specific way or a more-vague way.114 A more
"complete" contract may include regular reporting or monitoring requirements.
Or a less "complete" contract may require no reporting and no monitoring at
all.' A third dimension of contract completeness concerns the use of financial
incentives. Financial incentives often go hand-in-hand with task specification and
111. Many scholars have differentiated between compliance and motivational or performance
effects in this area, but a forthcoming article by Constantine Boussalis and colleagues does a
particularly good job surveying the literature using this framework. See Constantine
Boussalis et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Specificity on Compliance and
Performance, REG & GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1, 3),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID2708193 code2338814.pdfabstractid=
2539190 [https://perma.cc/AH8C-55P3]; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 309; Erik A.
Mooi & Mrinal Ghosh, Contract Specificity and its Performance Implications, 74 J. MARKETING
105, 106 (2010) (noting specification leads agents to focus on particular tasks); Gerard H. Seijts &
Gary P. Latham, The Effect of Distal Learning, Outcome, and Proximal Goals on a Moderately
Complex Task, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 291, 302, 304 (2001) (finding specific, challenging
goals make agents desire to perform better and exert higher levels of effort).
112. Ray Worthy Campbell, The End of Law Schools: Legal Education in the Era of Legal
Service Businesses, 85 Miss. L.J. 1, 50 (2016) ("[C]ompliance requires an understanding of the
legal requirements imposed on corporations . . . .").
113. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing
Transactions, 96 VA. L. REV. 241, 256 (2010) ("It is important, therefore, to go beyond any
aggregate measure of complexity and to look more carefully at specific terms, structures, and
features in a micro-analytical manner.").
114. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2006) (discussing the value of using vague terms for contract conditions);
Posner, supra note 108, at 1582-83 (examining the costs and benefits of using specific terms in
contracts).
115. The decision to include monitoring or reporting requirements might actually impact party
performance differently. Reporting requirements, for instance, may convey more trust of the agent
than monitoring if the reporting is self reporting and the monitoring is third-party monitoring.
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monitoring-for instance, a contract may specify goals, require reporting on the
goals, and award funds for the achievement of the goals. But contracts could also
include provisions for awarding discretionary bonuses not necessarily tied to
specific tasks.116
In the health-care sector, the move from fee for service to pay for
performance is a move along the contract-completeness pectrum. The fee-for-
service approach, relatively speaking, did not specify tasks in detail, did not
make significant use of monitoring or reporting, and did not utilize financial
incentives.117 Payers did little to define desired goals or outcomes or even
processes in which providers should engage. And in general, assuming the
services provided fell within reimbursable categories, payers promised to pay for
the services rendered.
Incentive-based compensation is, in many ways, the opposite, requiring
116. These are not the only three aspects of contract completeness worth separately considering.
Empiricists have suggested many other ways to classify contract drafting strategies. See, e.g.,
George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. REv.
241, 256 (2010). But these three aspects of contract completeness are the most salient for present
purposes.
117. For instance, a sample fee-for-service contract between a provider and CMS is a single-
page agreement. It states simply that the provider agrees to request "direct Part B payment from the
Medicare program" and that the payment will be the "full charge for the service covered under Part
B" other than the applicable deductible and coinsurance. See, e.g., Medicare Participating




118. Medicare does set the reimbursable rates for procedures and only covers what it considers
"medically necessary." And there are other preconditions to reimbursement, including state laws
that dictate what services a particular type of practitioner is licensed to provide and both national
and local coverage decisions made as to whether a particular item or service is covered under
Medicare's rules. See Learning What Medicare Covers and How Much You Pay, CTRS. FOR
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much more detailed contract drafting." 9 The payer must provide detailed criteria
to which a physician must adhere and must define the financial implications of
meeting, exceeding, or falling short of those metrics. If fee-for-service contracts
tend to be less specific in task definition and not make use of reporting and
financial incentives (i.e., payers agree to pay regardless of performance),
incentive-based compensation is a move toward the other end of the contract-
drafting spectrum: higher on task specificity and a greater use of contractual
control mechanisms, such as monitoring and financial incentives.
One of the main insights of this Article is to suggest the literature that
studies the effect of contract-drafting strategy on party performance should
inform this new strategy in the health-care industry.120
B. The Literature on Compliance and Motivation
Contract-drafting choices can influence party performance in ways that are
more complicated than the early literature-more complete is better and less
complete is bad suggested.
In an ideal world, contracts would prompt both agent compliance and agent
motivation. The question is: Can a shift from a less complete to a more complete
contract prompt both, or is there a competing effect between the two? The next
subpart considers what effects specifying tasks, using monitoring and reporting
mechanisms, and employing financial incentives have on both compliance and
motivation. There is a lot of nuance in the literature, but one major takeaway is
that the more complex the task and the more the principal wants to prompt agent
119. See Stout, supra note 19, at 536 (2014).
120. For a significant portion of the population, what the contract actually says matters to
performance. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device:
Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997); Eileen Chou et al., The Devil Is in the
Details: Less Specific Contracts Promote Feelings of Autonomy, Intrinsic Motivation and Work
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creativity, innovation, and top effort level, the less well the incentive
compensation model will fit.
1. Task Specification
Many studies have shown that task specification aids cognition, particularly
in the obvious way that people better understand what they are supposed to do
when the task is spelled out in some detail. Consider the task of putting together
the Ultimate Collector's Millennium Falcon (Star Wars) LEGO@ Set, which has
over 10,000 pieces.121 While a user may understand the overall goal of the project
without the detailed instructions, to build a LEGO@ Millennium Falcon, the
detailed instructions certainly help the average user understand how best to get
from point A (a box full of 10,000 individual Legos) to point B (the completed
Millennium Falcon).122
In the contract context specifically, studies have demonstrated that drafting
more-detailed clauses that clearly specify responsibilities reduces the likelihood
of agent misunderstanding.123 And, in general, there a line of research in both the
goal-setting literature, specifically, and the behavioral literature, more broadly,
that seems to suggest clear instructions are superior to less-specific ones for the
purpose of directing an agent's understanding of a project and ensuring
compliance with dictates.
Complexity, however, is an important variable. Research has also shown that
specification of very complex tasks actually creates a perception of vagueness
and leads to under-compliance.124
Other studies also document less-positive effects of specificity on cognition
and compliance. For instance, task specificity can cause agents to focus on the
specified details to the detriment of other, less-highly-specified elements of the
121. LEGO, http://shop.lego.com/en-US/Millennium-Falcon-
7 5 105 [https://perma.cc/9F4S-
DCYD].
122. This assumes that there is a well-tested path to success. If the goal were to prompt users to
find the best way to build the Millennium Falcon with the provided pieces, detailed instructions
may negatively impact creativity. See, e.g., Christina E. Shalley et al., The Effects of Personal and
Contextual Characteristics on Creativity: Where Should We Go from Here?, 30 J. MGMT. 933
(2004) (synthesizing studies on prompting creativity).
123. See, e.g., Mooi & Ghosh, supra note 111 at 108 (Mar. 2010) (arguing greater specificity in
procurement contracts for IT hardware/software decreases the likelihood for misunderstanding
between the parties); Kenneth H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships:
Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, 64 J. MARKETING 36, 39 (2000) (noting, in general, lack of
contractual specificity enables a party to evade contractual obligations).
124. See J6r6me Barth6lemy & Bertrand V. Qu6lin, Complexity of Outsourcing
Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation, 43 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1775,
1790 (2006) (noting the high complexity of outsourcing contracts makes performance specification,
verification, and monitoring difficult); Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel. Uncertainty Revisited: Legal
Prediction and Legal Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REv. 467, 486 (2008) ("Different levels of
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task. In other words, task specification directs attention away from understanding
the ultimate goal of the work.125
Studies of the checklist approach demonstrate this point. Checklists are used
to ensure compliance with a specified set of tasks, and have proven effective at
improving performance.126 This is particularly true in situations such as an
airplane cockpit where pilots have to remember many details under pressure.
However, checklists have also been shown to impede cognition and decrease
project-level compliance because they make tasks automatic.127 Checklists
discourage thinking, which in some situations can be a detriment to performance.
In sum, task specification enables cognition and prompts compliance where
the task is relatively straightforward and the agent has the ability to execute the
task without the need to do much learning. Specification is less likely to prompt
compliance for complex tasks that require understanding of the overall task
rather than piecemeal tasks, or tasks that require individual thinking and
creativity.
Whether or not task specification is good for agent motivation is an area of
much study -and some dispute in the literature.128 Some studies have found that
specific, challenging goals make agents desire to perform better and exert higher
levels of effort.129 In other words, task specification can make agents rise to the
125. See Boussalis et al., supra note 111, at 6 (noting that setting goals based on the volume of
task units completed may decrease creativity); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein,
Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 165 (2015) (discussing the use of vague standards coupled with
specific examples, a so-called "catalog approach").
126. See, e.g., Robert Gibbons & Rebecca Henderson, What Do Managers Do? Exploring
Persistent Performance Differences Among Seemingly Similar Enterprises, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONoMICs 680-731 (R. Gibbons and J. Roberts eds., 2013).
127. Bridgette M. Hales & Peter J. Pronovost, The Checklist: A Tool for Error Management and
Performance Improvement, 21 J. CRITICAL CARE 231, 234 (2006) ("Checklist 'fatigue,' whereby the
overwhelming number of available or required checklists becomes a hindrance rather than an aid, is
becoming a more common theme in areas that have been heavily targeted with this type of
intervention. If overused ... checklists can act to impede the quality and speed of service delivery.
Checklist users may also become dependent on these tools in their practice, which can interfere
both with their professional judgment and the objectivity of their decision-making process.").
128. Some scholars suggest less task specification increases agent motivation. See, e.g., Gibbons
& Henderson, supra note 126; see also George G. Triantis, The ETficiency of Vague Contract Terms:
A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REv. 1065, 1072 (2002)
(noting that conditioning reward on specified tasks distorts efforts to those tasks and away from
ones the agent might otherwise have undertaken). Meanwhile, other scholars argue task
specification increases agent motivation. See Emily C. Haisley & Roberto A. Weber, Self-Serving
Interpretations of Ambiguity in Other-Regarding Behavior, 68 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 614-25
(2010); Seijts & Latham, supra note 111.
129. Gary P. Latham & Edwin A. Locke, Goal Setting -A Motivational Technique that Works, 8
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 68, 75 (1979) ("Specific, challenging goals lead to better performance
than do easy or vague goals. . . ."). But see Eileen Chou et al., The Control-Motivation Dilemma:
Contract Specificity Undermines Intrinsic Motivation, Persistence, and Creativity 3-4 (2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (demonstrating through experiment that less-specific








Specification may also be beneficial for motivating agent performance
because task specification could reduce the likelihood that agents would use
ambiguity to justify questionable behavior that does not benefit the principal.13 1
For instance, several studies have shown that agents are more likely to act
dishonestly or immorally in the face of contractual ambiguity than in the face of
-132specificity.
But this is an area where there seems to be conflict in the literature because
many studies have also shown that task specificity can signal mistrust and can
crowd out an agent's intrinsic desire to perform well.1 33 In the contract setting,
for these reasons, more-specific contracts can lead to poorer agent performance
than less-specific ones.134
Task specification has also been shown to decrease motivation particularly
where the task is complex and learning is still ongoing.135 There is therefore now
much support for the idea that task specification decreases effort level because it
crowds out intrinsic motivation.'36
130. See Seijts & Latham, supra note 111.
131. See Haisley & Weber, supra note 128.
132. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?,
100 GEO. L.J. 5, 12 (2011) (discussing a study where participants playing the role of painters who
must choose between using a generic paint of inferior quality or a better quality paint were more
likely to choose the lower quality paint if they were told that the lower quality paint may or may
not "be deemed a breach of a contractual obligation to use 'reasonable' materials"); see also Yuval
Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REv. L. & ECoN. 81 (2008) (discussing
a study documenting relationship between self-interest and legal ambiguity); Nina Mazar & Dan
Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING
117, 121-22 (2006) (analyzing the role of self-deception in dishonest behavior).
133. In a famous study testing the motivational effects of implicit versus explicit contracts, Fehr
and Gachter found that principals who chose the explicit contract lost on average nine tokens per
contract, compared to a profit of 26 tokens per implicit contract and that the difference was
attributable to effort levels. Ernst Febr & Simon Gichter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics
of Reciprocity, 14 J. EcoN. PERSP. 159, 170 (2000); see also Ernst Fehr et al., supra note 120, at
833.
134. Chou et al., supra note 120 at 5; see also Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal
Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 707, 711-12 (2000) (discussing the importance of lack of specificity to increase in trust);
Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 1611, 1612-13
(2006) ("[A]gents are averse to being controlled, and consequently lower their performance if the
principal implements a more complete contract.").
135. See Lisa D. Ord6fiez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Side Effects of Over-Prescribing Goal
Setting, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-083),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-08
3 .pdf [https://perma.cc/7DYR-WQR5];
Nicholas Argyres et al., Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical
Study oflT Services Contracts, 18 ORG. Sci. 3 (2007).
136. See sources cited supra notes 120, 122, 124, 134.
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2. Monitoring/Reporting Mechanisms
In addition to specifying tasks, many contracts also require that an agent
report on certain metrics or subject themselves to external monitoring of
performance. The primary purpose of reporting requirements and monitoring
rights is to prevent opportunistic behavior and ensure compliance. But there is
some controversy about how well it works, and what effect such terms have on
motivation.
First, requiring reporting or monitoring forces agents to focus on contractual
requirements. This is particularly true if reporting is likely to be linked to
either a positive or negative consequence.139 Agents react to and are likely to
comply in the case of measurable metrics.140 This result is not surprising. Agents
are more likely to do what is asked of them if they know the principal will be
watching.14 1
Yet as with task specification, reporting requirements also focus an agent's
attention on certain aspects of performance that are designated important because
reporting is required or because it is being monitored. This leaves less cognitive
attention to be focused on other aspects of the contract where reporting and
monitoring are not pertinent.142
A related negative implication of reporting and monitoring requirements is
that it can prompt gaming behavior. Agents who know they will be evaluated
based on reported metrics tend to act dishonestly to maximize those metrics that
will in turn better their individual position (financially or otherwise).143
But perhaps one of the biggest concerns about monitoring is its implications
for motivation.144 Monitoring and reporting mechanisms should, in theory, cause
137. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 581-96 (discussing use of
Supplier Scorecards to report compliance with relatively objective performance metrics).
138. SeeBoussalis et al., supra note 111, at 7 ("[P]eople's intrinsic motivation to perform well is
crowded out by the relationship between performance, measurement, and payment. Therefore,
specificity combined with monitoring that focuses only on given measurable components (the letter
of the law) seems to produce a straightforward effect of crowding out intrinsic motivation and
decreasing overall performance.").
139. See Edward P. Lazear, The Power of Incentives, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 410-14 (2000)
(arguing that when compensation is tied too closely to performance, employees are likely to focus
on the specific tasks tied to compensation, potentially declining to pursue other beneficial options).
140. Id.
141. Boussalis et al., supra note 111, at 7 (noting that agents focus more attention on measurable
metrics).
142. Boussalis et al., supra note 111, at 7 ("According to these theories, over time, the accuracy
of measurement decreases as people concentrate their effort strictly on the measured components of
an activity, resulting in a decline in the overall quality of their performance.").
143. See, e.g., Gunter G. Shulze & Bjorn Frank, Deterrence Versus Intrinsic Motivation:
Experimental Evidence ofthe Determinants of Corruptibility, 4 ECON. GOVERNANCE 143 (2003).
144. David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease
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agents to exert high levels of effort. In the absence of monitoring or reporting, the
concern is that agents will not exert effort because they lack an effective way to
find out how they performed.
Some studies confirm the theory in practice.145 For instance, a 2008 study
found that monitoring results in agents increasing their level of effort.1
46
However, the same study reports that when monitoring exceeds a certain
threshold, motivation begins to be crowded out and agents actually exert less
effort. 147
Just as specification can signal distrust and crowd out intrinsic motivation, it
seems so can monitoring. Or at least that monitoring can negatively impact the
relationship between principal and agent. That is what a 2013 review of the
literature determined.148 Essentially, an agent is more motivated by having
discretion in a task, reading discretion to mean that the principal is conveying an
element of trust. An agent reacts less well to the suggestion that the principal
must be watching to ensure good performance. There is similar evidence about
the function of financial incentives, which is discussed below.
3. Financial Incentives
Financial incentives are specifically designed to direct focus and improve
effort level. In the law and economics account, individuals will focus their
attention on tasks that are directly tied to compensation and will exert high levels
of effort if that effort will be financially rewarded.14 9 The efficacy of financial
incentives is hotly debated in the literature. Some studies suggest that they work
to prompt compliance. so This tends to be most frequently the case for tasks that
ECON. BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008) (noting that monitoring has the potential to decrease agent
motivation).
145. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972) (developing theory); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAw & EcoN 301 (1983)
(developing theory).
146. Dickinson & Villeval, supra note 144.
147. Id.
148. Margit Osterloh & Bruno Frey, Motivation Governance, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMiC
ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 26-40 (Anna Grandori ed.,
2013).
149. See Boussalis et al., supra note 111, at 4 ("According to the rational choice prediction, the
agent focuses most of his work on the tasks for which he can be given an incentive").
150. See, e.g., Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, The Effect of Incentive Contracts on Learning and
Performance, 75 ACCT. REV. 299, 299 (2000); see also Antonio Guiffrida & David J. Torgerson,
Should We Pay the Patient? Review of Financial Incentives to Enhance Patient Compliance, 315
BRITISH MED. J. 703, 706 (Sept. 20, 1997) (noting "the use of some form of financial inducement
increases compliance" with patient treatment plans); Joseph E. Murphy, Using Incentives in Your
Compliance and Ethics Program, Soc'Y CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS 15 (Nov. 2011) ("Incentives
can work as effective tools for a business that wishes to promote compliance by employing
concrete actions." (quoting Corporate Compliance Programs, CANADA BUREAU COMPETITION 21
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-bulletin-corp-
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are fairly mechanical and require little cognitive effort,'51 for instance, replacing
windshields.152
However, studies also find that compliance may be temporary.'" And there
is the same concern as with reporting requirements that incentives can prompt
cheating or untoward manipulation.154
There is also a large body of literature suggesting that agents are actually
less compliant and exert less effort when subject to incentives. A number of
famous experiments suggest the reason for this is that incentives crowd out
intrinsic motivation. For instance, college students will spontaneously work on
challenging puzzles, but lose interest once they are paid a fee to solve them.1 56
Fewer people will donate blood once an incentive payment is added.15 7 A
randomized controlled trial at an Israeli day care found that where fines were
compliance-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-bulletin-corp-compliance-e.pdf rhttps://perma.cc/D7BV-PDAD]));
Lois Synder & Richard L. Neubauer, Pay-for-Performance Principles That Promote Patient-
Centered Care: An Ethics Manifesto, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 793 (2007) ("Pay-for-
performance and other programs that create strong incentives for high-quality care set up a
potential conflict between this duty [to care for patients] and the competing interest of trying to
comply with a performance measure-whether the measure is a priority for that patient or not.").
151. Dan Ariely et al., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working
Paper No. 05-11, 2005) (demonstrating pay-for-performance works for mechanical tasks, but if
cognitive skills are required, it leads to poorer performance); see DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE
SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 103 (2009).
152. See Matthew Wynia, The Risks of Rewards in Health Care: How Pay-for-Performance
Could Threaten, or Bolster Medical Professionalism, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 884, 885 (2009).
153. See Pat Redmond et al., Can Incentives for Healthy Behavior Improve Health and Hold
Down Medicaid Costs?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (June 2007),
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/6-1-07health.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ44-FNZK]; Drake Baer,
Why Incentives Don't Actually Motivate People to do Better Work, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-incentives-dont-actually-make-people-do-better-work-2014-3
[https://perma.cc/ST36-FRFA]; Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, https://hbr.org/1993/09/why-incentive-plans-cannot-work [https://perma.cc/2F7J-
GRFX]; Dyann M. Matson et al., The Impact of Incentives and Competitions on Participation and
Quit Rates in Worksite Smoking Cessation Programs, 7 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 270, 270-80
(1993).
154. Adam Grant & Jitendra Singh, The Problem with Financial Incentives - and What to Do
About It, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Mar. 30, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-
problem-with-financial-incentives-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/CZ4M-EJJ2]
("Incentives can enhance performance, but they don't guarantee that employees will earn them
by following the most moral or ethical paths. . . . [W]hen people are rewarded for goal
achievement, they are more likely to engage in unethical behavior, such as cheating.").
155. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 308-09 (explaining autonomy tends to boost motivation more
than control, which signals distrust); see also Chou et al., supra note 120 at 5; Edward L. Deci et
al., Facilitating Internalization: The Self-Determination Theory Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY
119, 122 (1994); Wendy S. Grolnick & Richard M. Ryan, Parent Styles Associated with Children &
Self-Regulation and Competence in School, 81 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 143, 144 (1989); Richard M.
Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation,
Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 70 (2000).
156. Edward Deci, supra note 11, at 114-15.
157. See Lorenz Goette et al., Prosocial Motivation and Blood Donations: A Survey of the
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imposed for tardy retrieval of children, parents responded by increasing rates of
late pick up (the opposite of the intended effect).158 The explanation was that
absent a fine, parents felt a moral duty to retrieve their children on time. Once a
fine was implemented, it turned into a market transaction: as long as parents were
willing to pay the fee, it was acceptable to pick up their children late.
Context seems to matter. Intrinsic motivation is likely to be strongest in
situations with a strong moral framing (such as donating blood) or ones that are
cognitively challenging. In those situations, financial incentives seem to have the
potential to be most harmful in crowding out that intrinsic motivation.159 When
intrinsic motivation is not strong, incentives are more likely to work as economic
theory predicts. This may also explain why incentives work well for more
repetitive or rote tasks, which are not the type of work people tend to be
intrinsically motivated to do in the first place.
But even this distinction is not entirely straightforward. For instance, in one
study comparing flat-wage compensation contracts to incentive contracts in an
experiment that required both exerting effort and learning over time-which
should be intrinsically motivating-the subjects receiving incentive pay exerted
higher levels of effort and learned more over the course of the experiment.'60 The
author theorized that "the incentive-based contract . .. motivate[d] participants to
implement the first-best strategy . . . and to use feedback to maximize the total
expected performance." 161
C. Lessons About Highly Detailed Contracts That Use Reporting Mechanisms
and Financial Incentives
Contract drafters use various techniques in an attempt to prompt compliance
and motivation. While it would be ideal for a strategy to positively impact both,
what the evidence suggests is that the relationship between these strategies is
complex and, at times, competing.
For instance, there is solid evidence suggesting that task specification works
best for delivering cognitive clarity and directing the agent's focus to particular
tasks.1 62 Task specification tends to work better to prompt compliance with easily
defined tasks than it does to motivate agents to innovate or come up with creative
158. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
159. See Edward Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of
Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 650-52 (1999); see also
Bohnet et al., at 131-51 (finding incentive contracts decrease cooperation); Bruno S. Frey & Reto
Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589,
589-612 (2001) (suggesting that monetary incentives are not as effective as reciprocity
arrangements for providing motivation).
160. See Sprinkle, supra note 150, at 310, 319-20.
161. See id. at 302.
162. See, e.g., Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham, New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory, 15
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 265 (2006); Mark A. Mone & Christine E. Shalley, Effects
Specificity on Change in Strategy and Performance Over Time, 8 HuM. PERFORMANCE 243 (1995).
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solutions to complex problems.163 It comes with a risk of overly focusing on the
specified metrics to the detriment of commitment to the success of the overall
project, so specification seems to be best used in areas where this type of focus is
less of a concern.164 These areas likely overlap with the simple versus
complicated divide. There is little risk of hyperfocus when the task is relatively
straightforward in the first place.65 There is more risk when the task is
complicated and the principal needs the agent to comply with all aspects of the
project, not just those that are highly specified.16 6
Reporting and monitoring also tend to be the best fit for easier, compliance-
based tasks.'67 The risk with monitoring is that agents will view it as a signal of
distrust and will exert lower effort in response.168 But if monitoring is used to
ensure compliance-e.g., with a checklist-where there is little expectation of
creativity, it can be useful and can be effective to deter opportunistic behavior.169
Financial incentives also seem to work best for compliance-oriented tasks
rather than complex tasks that require creativity and consummate performance.170
But even as to simple tasks, the effect is not straightforward. Whether or not
strong intrinsic or morality-based motivation exists in the first place seems to be
an important determinant.
This nuance might help to explain why results of incentive-pay schemes in
health care and in other industries have been so mixed. Incentive-based
compensation is a contract-drafting strategy that employs task specification,
reporting and monitoring, and the use of financial incentives. That approach is
likely to be effective only in a relatively small subset of contexts. The next Part
illustrates this point.
III. INCENTIVE BASED COMPENSATION: THE EVIDENCE So FAR
Although incentive-based compensation is, relatively speaking, new to
health care, it has long been employed in other industries, such as executive
compensation, professional sports, and education. These three industries provide
an interesting comparison to health care because despite some salient differences,
163. See, e.g., Shalley et al., supra note 122.
164. See Mone & Shalley, supra note 162; Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-
Interested Citizens May Undermine 'The Moral Sentiments': Evidence from Economic
Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605 (2008); Holstrom & Milgrom, supra note 10.
165. Holstrom & Milgrom, supra note 10.
166. Id.
167. Id; see also MICHAEL DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY
EXPERIMENT FAILED AND How To Fix IT (2014) (discussing difficulties in motivating CEO-level
employees with incentive pay).
168. See, e.g., Falk & Kosfeld, supra note 134.
169. See Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, Monitoring Versus Incentives, 45 EUROPEAN
ECON. REv. 1741 (2001).
170. This is one of the main arguments in Daniel Pink's book Drive: The Surprising Truth About
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in all three contexts, an agency problem motivates the use of performance
incentives. A principal is concerned that a utility-maximizing agent will not act
in the principal's best interests and that the agent has better information than the
principal about the effort that the agent exerts. As such, the principal designs a
compensation structure-implemented by contract-intended to provide the
agent with incentives to act in the principal's best interests. In all three contexts,
performance incentives are used in somewhat analogous ways to how they are
used in health care. Additionally, all three contexts have seen some success with
incentive compensation and have noted some areas for concern.
This Part argues that the experience with incentive pay in other industries is
accurately predicted by the theoretical literature explained in Part II, where the
most important takeaway was that the "complete" contracting mechanisms (task
specification, monitoring, and financial incentives) are a better fit for easily
measurable, compliance-oriented tasks than for tasks requiring the exercise of
discretion and an agent's top performance.
A. Experience with Incentive Pay in Other Industries
1. Executive Compensation
The most studied use of incentive pay is in executive compensation. Before
the advent of the modern corporation, businesses were owner run. The dairy
farmer who sold his milk was also the one who cared for and milked the cows.
The owner had all the incentive he needed to act in ways that would maximize
the profitability of the enterprise. There was a direct link between owner
performance and owner profit. But as businesses began to transition from owner
run to manager run, agency problems and moral hazard arose.171 To solve the
agency problem, different techniques were developed to align managerial
incentives with those of the businesses they were entrusted to run. The earliest
ones were the imposition of fiduciary duties,172 which were in many ways
insufficient.'73  Next came a market-based solution: linking executive
compensation to some measure of corporate profit or stock price.1
74 Proponents
171. See ADOLPH BERLE, JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
172. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death ofFiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1675, 1675 (1990) ("[T]he law of corporations historically has attempted to provide a
principled and coherent set of regulations to ensure those who hold power are accountable to those
who are dependent upon its fair exercise.").
173. David A. Hoffman, Self-Handicapping and Managers'Duty of Care, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 803, 805 (2007) (noting corporate managers rarely face monetary damages for violations of
fiduciary duties due to the business judgment rule, exculpation, and indemnification).
174. See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 61 (1992); Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive
Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper Incentive Pay, 98 CAL. L. REv. 385, 437 (2010); Michael
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus.
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of incentive pay for executives argue that:
a well-designed compensation scheme can make up for the fact that
directors cannot monitor or evaluate many of their top executives'
decisions. Such a well-designed scheme can substantially reduce agency
costs, improve performance, and increase shareholder value.175
In the 1980s and 1990s-particularly after Michael Jensen and Kevin
Murphy's influential article on the topiC176_executive compensation packages
that included some element of performance pay proliferated.17 7 Performance pay
runs the gamut from short-term, formula-driven incentives (for example a CEO
might receive a bonus tied to incremental profitability of the company) to long-
term incentives that may .look at performance over a three to five year period.
And according to at least one survey by Stanford School of Business, "CEOs and
directors believe that 75 percent of a CEO's compensation" in large U.S.
companies is tied in some way to performance. 178
With notable exceptions, quantitative and qualitative empirical work
suggests that performance pay for executives is an effective motivator. 179 Studies
REv., May-June 1990, at 138 (calling for executive incentive-based compensation).
175. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 28, at 19 (stating the theoretical argument, but then
explaining why it does not work that way in practice).
176. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 174.
177. This was especially true for publicly traded companies without a controlling stockholder.
But performance pay has also now been introduced at lower hierarchy levels. See Steven Kaplan &
Josh Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?,
REV. FIN. STUD. (2007); Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So
Much?, 123 Q. J. ECON. 49 (2008).
178. CEOs and Directors on Pay: 2016 Survey on CEO Compensation, STAN. GRADUATE SCH.
Bus. 2 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-survey-2016-ceo-
compensation_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ2T-8Z4Z].
179. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 174; Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-
Centric Reality, 161 U. PAnL. REv. 1907, 1914 (2013) ("[F]ixed pay may lead managers to seek
quiet lives, while performance pay can motivate managers."); Susan J. Stabile, Motivating
Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 229 (1999) ("Contingent compensation motivates executives and/or
rewards them."); Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGs L.J.
437, 448 (2003) ("[I]ncentive pay can motivate workers to put forth their best efforts."); Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004,
2004), at 19 (July 12, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=561305
[https://perma.cc/5J93-3LD9] ("A well-designed remuneration package for executives ... will
accomplish three things: attract the right executives at the lowest cost; retain the right executives at
the lowest cost . . ; and motivate executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value
and avoid actions that destroy value."). But see Stout, supra note 19, at 536-37 (2014) ("[Tjhe
ideology of incentives is being embraced ... despite the fact that there is little or no empirical
evidence to demonstrate it actually works"); James F. Reda, David M. Schmidt & Kimberly A.
Glass, Study of 2013 Short- and Long-Term Incentive Design Criterion Among Top 200 S&P 500
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have found that, particularly over short periods of time, incentive pay for
executives can be correlated with an increase in corporate stock price.80 Scholars
theorize that incentive compensation works particularly well to motivate
executives in an industry where profit motivation is typically strong.18 1 Also,
incentive-based compensation is easy to implement in executive pay because
metrics such as profit and stock price are, relatively speaking, easy to measure
and verify, at least compared with other options.'82
But the downsides of incentive pay for executives are also now well
documented.183 Incentive pay causes executives to focus on the metrics to which
compensation is tied, causing short-shrift to be given to other aspects of the
business.184 Indeed, executives have been shown to manipulate the performance
criteria in their favor, or game the system to maximize rewards.'85 Incentive pay
has also been shown to substitute motivation based on financial reward for the
intrinsic motivation, or professional commitment to success, that had previously
existed.186
2013-short-and-long-term-incentive-design-criterion-among-top-
2 0 0 .pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ7B-
FULG] (finding that where companies used total shareholder eturn as the incentive metric, stocks
underperformed compared to companies using other benchmarks such as earnings-per-share based
on generally accepted accounting principles).
180. See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 77, 20-22 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=1582232 [https://perma.cc/NS9S-34P4] (discussing multiple studies
demonstrating a link between incentive pay and firm performance). But see Share and Share
Unalike, ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 1999), http://www.economist.com/node/230106
[https://perma.cc/KZ5C-6MDY] ("[T]here is surprising little direct evidence that higher pay-
performance sensitivities lead to higher stock performance." (quoting Kevin Murphy, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION, in A HANDBOOK OF LABOUR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds.,
1998))); Michael J. Cooper et al., Performance for Pay? The Relationship Between CEO Incentive
Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance 26 (Working Paper, Nov. 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1572085 [https://perma.cc/9G3F-PAMV]
(finding a negative relation between CEO incentive compensation and firm stock price).
181. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-11 (Oct. 1976) (discussing confounding variables).
182. Id
183. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 28, at 19 (2004) (explaining that because executives tend to
be risk-averse, performance based compensation is worth less to them).
184. Kristopher Yingling, Comment, Pay Ratio Disclosure: Another Failed Attempt to Curtail
Executive Compensation, 18 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 203, 212-13 (2015) ("Incentive-based compensation ...
induced excessive short-term risks through its asymmetrical rewards. Because companies used certain
metrics, like stock price, to determine CEO's performance, they greatly incentivized CEOs to expand
those metrics to increase their own compensation.").
185. Bruno Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J.
MGMT. INQUIRY 96, 97 (2005) (summarizing studies finding a connection between executive
incentive-based pay and fraudulent activity).
186. Kohn, supra note 154, at 62 ("Few will be shocked by the news that extrinsic motivators
are a poor substitute for genuine interest in one's job. What is far more surprising is that rewards,
like punishment, may actually undermine the intrinsic motivation that results in optimal
performance."); LUKAS HENGARTNER, EXPLAINING EXECUTIVE PAY: THE ROLES OF MANAGERIAL
POWER AND COMPLEXITY 41 (2007).
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Worse, incentive pay can induce excessive risk taking and even fraudulent
behavior.187 It is said to have contributed to some of the worst economic crises of
the past thirty years, from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s to the 2008
credit crisis spurred by subprime loans.188 This is in part because of the risk-
taking behavior executives engaged in to maximize personal compensation under
incentive-pay schemes.89
2. Professional Sports
As in executive compensation, professional sports teams frequently employ
methods of incentive-based compensation in contracts with their players to
mitigate an agency problem.190 Teams want to ensure that their players exert the
highest possible effort levels. Players may not be motivated to exert top effort for
any number of reasons. For instance, they may fear injury or less longevity in the
sport if they do exert top effort, or perhaps they can earn their large salaries
without the need to exert top effort.191 Information asymmetry is also a problem
in that players know the effort they are exerting, but management, to an extent,
does not.192
The agency problem in this context is somewhat less severe, however, than
in other contexts. For one, while a player best knows his own level of effort,
effort level is to some extent publicly observable.'93 Intrinsic motivation to
perform well in professional sports and social norms to perform well and win
games may also be somewhat stronger in the sports context than in other
contexts.194 Still, sports teams use a number of different types of incentive pay to
induce optimal level of effort, generally falling into two categories: team
incentives and individual incentives. 95
187. See Stout, supra note 19, at 534 (noting that incentive pay has been statistically linked with
"earning manipulations, accounting frauds, and excessive risk-taking.").
188. See id.
189. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275, 1327-28 (2003); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 273 (1999).
190. Daniel Faber, The Evolution of Techniques for Negotiation of Sports Employment
Contracts in the Era of the Agent, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 165, 189-190 (1993)
(describing performance bonuses in famous athletes' contracts).
191. See Bernd Frick, Performance, Salaries, and Contract Length: Empirical Evidence from
German Soccer, 6 INT'L J. SPORT FIN. 87 (2011) (describing the common view that players can vary
performance before and after signing a new contract); see also Dean Tripp et al., Fear ofReinjury,
Negative Affect, and Catastrophizing Predicting Return to Sport in Recreational Athletes With
Anterior Cruciate Ligament Injuries at 1 Year Postsurgery, 52 REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 74
(2007) (examining the effect the fear of re-injury has on an athlete's future performance).
192. Kevin J. Stiroh, Playing for Keeps: Pay and Performance in the NBA, 45 ECON. INQUIRY
145, 148 (2007).
193. Frick, supra note 191, at 90.
194. Id.
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Team incentives provide bonuses for team-level achievements: winning
games or winning intermediate or ultimate-level championships.196 They might
also reward achievements such as total points scored, team rankings in different
statistical categories, or the like.1 97
Individual incentives are also prevalent. Professional sports contracts,
however, limit the type of measures that can form part of players' payment
structure. Depending on the sport, there may be more emphasis on process
measures rather than outcome measures. For example, contracts in Major League
Baseball generally emphasize process (e.g., number of innings pitched) as
opposed to outcome (e.g., number of home runs hit).1 98 But in football, statistical
accomplishments (e.g., touchdown passes scored, yards rushed, etc.) can form the
basis of the incentive pay.199 Other measures include physical-conditioning
metrics (e.g., amount of weight lifted), playing time, and rankings compared to
other players.200 The use of financial incentives in American professional sports
leagues is extensive. 201 For instance, in the National Football League, sixty-five
to seventy-five percent of players receive payments based on individual
202
accomplishments.
in NFL Organizations, 47 MGmT. DECISION 110, 115 (2009).
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT'L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE & NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS Ass'N, Art. 7 § 6 (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/
2 01_ Final CBASearchabi
e_Bookmarked.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K52-CZ52] [hereinafter NFL Collective Bargaining].
198. See Faber, supra note 190, at 189 ("The professional sports industry needed a flexible
means of structuring contracts to pay athletes salaries that closely track performance. Sports law
responded with incentive bonuses. . . . [P]itcher Bob Walk with the Pittsburg Pirates received]
bonuses for innings pitched and pitching appearances.").
199. Id. at 189-90 ("Running back Mike Rozier's 1990 contract with the Atlanta Falcons was
structured [to provide Rozier] $30,000 for rushing for 200 yards, $30,000 for rushing for 400 yards,
and $40,000 for reaching 600 yards. Rozier gained 675 yards, thus earning $100,000 in bonuses.").
200. Mondello & Maxcy, supra note 195, at 115; see also NFL Collective Bargaining, supra
note 197, at Art. 7 § 6 (noting allowable performance incentives).
201. See Martin J. Greenberg, The Second Annual Sports Dollars & Sense Conference: A
Symposium on Sports Industry Contracts and Negotiations: Drafting of Player Contracts and
Clauses, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 51, 57 (1993) (discussing incentive clauses in professional sports
contracts); Jeffery A. Smith, It's Your Move -No It 's Not! The Application of Patent Law to Sports
Moves, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051, 1085-86 (1999) (discussing incentive clauses in professional
sports contracts such as being selected to the Pro Bowl and reaching predetermined levels of
performance); Frederick Tung, Bankruptcy Symposium: The Future Claims Representative in Mass
Tort Bankruptcy: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 43, 66 (2000) ("Player contracts in
professional sports . . . routinely contain bonus contingencies for exceptional performance based on
objective measures."); Melissa Steedle Bogad, Note, Maybe Jerry Maguire Should Have Stuck With
Law School: How the Sports Agent Responsibility And Trust Act Implements Lawyer-like Rules for
Sports Agents, 27 CARDOzo L. REv. 1889, 1903 (2006) (explaining Congressman Tom Osbourne
urged Congress to adopt legislation regulating agents, in part, due to the huge financial incentives
for athletes and agents in professional sports).
202. Mondello & Maxcy, supra note 195, at 115 ("In the NFL, incentive bonuses now account
for about 25 per cent of player compensation.").
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Financial incentives are thought to work well in the sports context for a
203number of reasons. First, athletic performance (if not effort level per se) can be
objectively measured.204 In professional sports, performance criteria are set by
205the league and are measured in a transparent and objective manner.
Second, although cooperation and team play are often necessary to success,
many professional sports emphasize personal abilities.206 In this sense, financial
incentives are well-suited to encourage individual effort.
Third, financial incentives in sports can be tied to short-term performance.20 7
As such, there is a closer temporal tie between effort and reward.
Some of the best evidence of the effects of incentive pay in sports come
from the tournament context. There, results have shown a correlation between
208financial incentives and player performance. Indeed, the magnitude and
differential between awards has received a lot of attention. In NASCAR racing, it
seems that increasing the prize differential going to top finishers has the potential
to increase overall driver performance.209
But the literature also documents some important challenges in the use of
performance pay in sports. For one, in team sports like football and basketball,
the statistics on which performance pay are based are only partially indicative of
the effort level of an individual player.2 10 The appearance of individual
performance also reflects the performance of teammates and of the opponent.211
203. Frick, supra note 191, at 90 (explaining how the objective data of professional sports
makes it easy to attach incentives to reach particular milestones).
204. Yehuda Baruch et al., Performance-Related Pay in Chinese Professional Sports, 15 INT. J.
oF HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 245 (2004).
205. Id.; see Frick, supra note 191, at 90.
206. Sherwin Rosen & Allen Sanderson, Labour Markets in Professional Sports, ECON. J., F47,
F52 (2001) (discussing the financial incentives for individual athletes to seek a competitive
advantage even in team sports).
207. Id.
208. Brian E. Becker & Mark A. Huselid, The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation
Systems, 37 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 336, 342 (1992).
209. Id
210. STANLEY COHEN, THE MAN IN THE CROWD: A FAN'S NOTES ON FOUR GENERATIONS OF NEW
YORK BASEBALL 208 (2012) ("Individual records in other [sports besides baseball] require a
measure of cooperation. Passing efficiency depends largely on the quality of the team's receivers,
the protection afforded the quarterback, even the running game. . . . But when a batter steps into the
batter's box he is all alone."); Roderick I. Swaab et al., The Too-Much-Talent Effect: Team
Interdependence Determines When More Talent is Too Much or Not Enough, 25 PSYCHOL. SC.
1581, 1582 (June 2014) (explaining basketball and football require a higher degree of task
interdependence, meaning "team members [must] cooperate and work interactively to complete
tasks," than baseball, which as a sport, has relatively low levels of interdependence, meaning "each
individual's talent contributes additively to the team's outcome, and thus less coordination among
team members is required").
211. Mondello & Maxcy, supra note 195, at 115 (explaining performance bonuses are divided
into team incentives, including winning games, total points scored, yards accumulated, and sacks
registered, and individual incentives, including statistical accomplishments such as touchdowns
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For instance, the number of yards a quarterback passes is dependent in large part
on the quality of the receivers he passes to and the quality of the defenders.2 12
Thus, while metrics are objective and observable, they are not perfect.
Second, the use of financial incentives can promote risk-taking behavior and
even cheating. The illegal use of steroids was a major problem in the 1990s and
2000s in Major League Baseball.213 While it is hard to quantify the extent to
which financial incentives encouraged steroid use rather than norms such as
professional acclaim and fame, theorists have examined how financial incentives
214
can bring out such behavior. Incentive effects have been shown to promote
risky behavior in other contexts, as well. For instance, larger prizes and a larger
prize differential between top finishers and lower finishers have been shown to
encourage more risk-taking in professional car racing.215
In short, pay does motivate performance, and it is thought to work well
because of ease of measurement. But the effect is complicated by other reasons to
perform well, both intrinsic (i.e., drive to succeed, reputation) and extrinsic (i.e.,
potential for endorsements).
3. Education
Just as shareholders and professional sports teams experience difficulties in
motivating their management and players respectively, schools face similar
challenges in motivating teacher performance. In education, the use of
performance pay is both prevalent and controversial.216 The most common
example is the award of bonuses to teachers based on their students' performance
217
on standardized tests. President George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind and
212. STANLEY COHEN, THE MAN IN THE CROWD: A FAN'S NOTES ON FOUR GENERATIONS OF NEW
YORK BASEBALL 208 (2012) ("Passing efficiency depends largely on the quality of the team's
receivers, the protection afforded the quarterback, even the running game.").
213. See The Steroids Era, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012), http://espn.go.com/mlb/topics//page/the-
steroids-era [https://perma.cc/P8EX-J4Y3].
214. See, e.g., Tiffany D. Lipscomb, Note, Can Congress Squeeze the "Juice" Out of
Professional Sports? The Constitutionality of Congressional Intervention into Professional Sports'
Steroid Controversy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 317 (2008) ("'Juiced' players typically perform better,
generating more revenue for owners, which in turn generates higher salaries for players."); Lisa
Pike Masteralexis, Drug Testing Provisions: An Examination of Disparities in Rules and Collective
Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 775, 777 (2006) ("[P]layers are playing in
an ultra-competitive environment where many, many players are striving for a limited number . . .
[of positions]. Anything that will take a player over that hurdle . .. will be enticing, especially when
one sees other players reaping substantial financial benefits, being rewarded by media, fans, and
management."); Edward Rippey, Contractual Freedom over Substance-Related Issues in Major
League Baseball, 1 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 159 (1994).
215. Becker & Huselid, supra note 208, at 344.
216. Donald Gratz, Special Topic: The Problem with Performance Pay, 67 EDUC. LEADERSHIP
76, 76 (2009) ("Education performance pay stretches back hundreds of years. In the mid-1800s,
British schools and teachers were paid on the basis of the results of student examinations, for
reasons much like today's.").
217. Sanctions are also employed, but usually sanctions function to penalize low-performing
41
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President Barack Obama's Race to the Top, both placed high stakes on
218standardized test scores. Both linked student test scores to teacher evaluations
and pay.219
The theory in the education context is that offering bonuses based on student
achievement will incentivize teachers to ensure that their students perform
better.220 This example is somewhat different from the prior two because the
incentive is not tied to individual performance directly, but to the performance of
third parties that the teacher is expected to influence. In this way, education
might be the closest analogy to health care, where patients are the relevant third
party. Some studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between
providing teachers with performance-based incentives and higher student
achievement (expressed through higher test scores).221 Teachers exert higher
effort levels when incentivized by pay tied to student test scores.222 And this
effect seems to apply whether bonuses are awarded for positive performance or
sanctions are threatened for negative performance.223
But other studies find the opposite. One large scale study that offered
incentives tied to students' test scores, graduation, and attendance rates that
provided up to $3,000 per teacher at high-needs New York City schools, found
that "incentives . . . did not increase student achievement in any meaningful way.
If anything, student achievement declined."224 In addition, a study in Tennessee
that found that students of teachers offered up to $15,000 in bonuses tied to
schools with removal of funds, not individual teachers. See generally Hanley Chiang, How
Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement, 93 J. PUB. EcoN. 1045
(2009) (discussing the long term impact of penalties for poor performance on student test scores).
218. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001 § 1001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012); Joseph P.
Viteritti, The Federal Role in School Reform: Obama s "Race to the Top ", 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
2087, 2121 (2012) (outlining Race to the Top).
219. See Viteritti, supra note 218 at 2108, 2110-11 (discussing teacher pay and evaluations
based on student success); see also Valerie Strauss, How and Why Convicted Atlanta Teachers
Cheated on Standardized Tests, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/04/01/how-and-why-convicted-
atlanta-teachers-cheated-on-standardized-tests [https://perma.cc/FYS7-FD9B].
220. See, e.g., David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, Individual Teacher Incentives and
Student Performance, 91 J. PUB. EcoN. 901 (2007).
221. See, e.g., David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, supra note 221, at 903 ("We find a
positive association between the use of individual teacher incentives and student achievement.");
Victor Lavy, Performance Pay and Teacher s Effort, Productivity, and Grading Efforts, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 1979 (2009). http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.5.1979
[https://perma.cc/752Q-FS2R].
222. See, e.g., David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, supra note 221 (concluding that one
explanation for findings was that providing teachers with monetary incentives based on student test
scores increases teacher effort).
223. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 217, at 1056 (noting that schools threatened with sanctions
led to an increase in math scores). Teachers seem most able to affect test scores when they
concentrate on basic skills that are relatively easy to teach, but more studies on this issue are
necessary. Id.
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student improvement did not perform significantly better than their peers taught
by teachers with standard compensation.22 5
Although evidence is not conclusive, for those who report efficacy of
performance pay, it is thought to work well because standardized tests provide an
objective measure of student performance.2 26 But as in the other contexts, the
measure is imperfect. Teachers may help students to improve test scores by
improving familiarity with the format of the test. And students may acquire
short-term knowledge sufficient to improve test scores that does not equate with
retained knowledge and long-term learning. If the goal of education is the latter,
227
improving the former is of limited value. Studies have shown that "teaching to
the test," rather than teaching to educate, is a pervasive problem.228
There are some additional well-documented challenges to utilizing
performance pay to motivate teachers and some confounding variables to
consider. First, when pay is linked to student test scores, teachers narrow their
curriculum to focus on tested material at the sacrifice of other worthy areas.229 In
general, teachers invest more effort in tasks that receive the most weight in the.
230
performance measurement system.
Second, teachers have been documented to be less willing to work with high,
needs students when subject to performance pay.231 Teachers tend to focus on
225. Matthew G. Springer et al., Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the





226. Steven Friedland, A Critical Inquiry into the Traditional Uses of Law School Evaluation,
23 PACE L. REV. 147, 156 (2002) ("[S]tandardized tests . . . provide an objective, reliable measure
of the relevant skills being tested."); 2013 State Teacher Policy Yearbook: National Summary,
NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY 10 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/2013_StateTeacherPolicyYearbookNationalSummary NCTQ
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK3T-BWVZ] (noting many states have tied student performance to
teacher evaluation).
227. See Eva L. Baker et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate Teachers,
EcoN. POL'Y INST. 7 (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/bp278.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PA8-HZ23] ("[Standardized tests] are narrow measures of what students know
and can do, relying largely on multiple-choice items that do not evaluate students' communication
skills, depth of knowledge and understanding, or critical thinking and performance abilities.").
228. See id at 16-17; Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, Catching Cheating Teachers: The
Results of an Unusual Experiment in Implementing Theory, 2003 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS
URB. AFF. 185 (describing the pervasive issue of "teaching to the test"); Craig D. Jerald, 'Teach to
the Test'? Just Say No, CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM & IMPROVEMENT 1-2 (2006),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED494086.pdf [https://perma.cc/D89Q-EQN6] (describing the
pervasiveness of "teaching to the test" and summarizing studies demonstrating poor generalization
when the curriculum focuses on preparation for standardized tests).
229. Jacob & Levitt, supra note 228, at 16 ("[A]n emphasis on test results for individual
teachers exacerbates the well-documented incentives for teachers to focus on narrow test-taking
skills, repetitive drill, and other undesirable instructional practices.").
230. Id.
231. Charles Clotfelter et al., Do School Accountability Systems Make It More Difficult for Low-
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students whose test scores can be improved with the least effort.
Third, when performance pay is utilized, studies have shown that teachers
232are less likely to collaborate. Also, "some argue that teacher incentives can
decrease a teacher's intrinsic motivation or lead to harmful competition between
teachers in what some believe to be a collaborative environment."233
Finally, just as incentive pay in executive compensation encouraged creative
accounting to maximize individual compensation, and in sports may have
encouraged players to illegally use steroids, financial incentives in education
seem to also encourage cheating on the metrics. A recent, well-publicized
example in Atlanta illustrates the point. In 2009, after the media started to
question how Atlanta public school students had substantially improved test
scores, the state investigated.23 4 It uncovered a wide range of cheating behavior
by both teachers and administrators, who changed student answers and
235misreported test scores. There are other documented examples of teachers and
administrators doctoring test scores to obtain personal bonuses,23 6 but it is
unknown to what extent such practices are employed nationwide.2 37
4. Experience in Other Industries Confirms Many Predictions of the
Contracts Literature
The experience in these three industries is illuminating for a number of
reasons. First, it seems to bear out many of the predictions of the literature. While
financial incentives do seem to motivate, at least according to some studies, they
tend to do so best where easy-to-measure goals are closely associated with the
Performing Schools to Attract and Retain High-Quality Teachers?, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
251 (2004) (describing a study on the effects of North Carolina's accountability system on low-
performing schools that found that low-performing schools perform even worse because quality
teachers are more reluctant to teach there); Jacob & Levitt, supra note 228, at 16 ("Within a school,
teachers will have incentives to avoid working with such students likely to pull down their teacher
effectiveness scores.").
232. See Baker et al., supra note 227, at 8.
233. Fryer, supra note 220, at 374 (citation omitted).
234. Strauss, supra note 219.
235. Nearly 180 employees were accused of wrongdoing in an effort to collect bonuses, or in
some cases, to keep threatened jobs. In April 2015, eleven teachers and administrators were
convicted of racketeering charges stemming from the scandal and sentenced to up to 20 years in
prison. Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/verdict-reached-in-atlanta-school-testing-trial.html
[https://perma.cc/H5Z4-Y7GG].
236. See, e.g., Winnie Hu & Noah Remnick, City Invalidates Test Scores of Third Graders at
Harlem School, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/nyregion/city-
invalidates-test-scores-of-third-graders-at-harlem-school.html [https://perma.cc/A6N9-DNHF]
(explaining that the results of third-grader standardized tests were invalidated after allegations of
testing improprieties by school's principal).
237. Also worth considering is the complaint that these bonuses give administrators too much








performance the principal wishes to prompt from the agent. But there is an
overarching difficulty in disentangling the effect of the financial motivation from
other sources of motivation-both intrinsic and extrinsic.239 This is especially
tricky in the context of professional motivation, which is also an issue in the
health-care context. And there are other overarching concerns. Financial
incentives seem to cause focus on the metric to which compensation is tied, and
in particular, promote paying attention to metrics that are easier to move, while
ignoring the harder cases.240 Performance pay can also encourage risk-taking
behavior and even cheating.
Second, it confirms that performance pay works better in some contexts than
others. Key attributes of successful performance pay systems appear to be: (1)
easy to define and measure tasks; (2) low ability or need to cheat on the metrics;
and (3) a low likelihood of crowding out already strong intrinsic motivation,
either because intrinsic motivation is weak to begin with or intrinsic motivation is
not particularly necessary to successful execution of the task.
B. Early Results ofIncentive Pay in Health Care
Although the use of performance pay in executive compensation, sports, and
education has a longer history, a preliminary set of data is developing in the
241health industry. Many of these early stage studies have significant
242
limitations. And it is worth noting that physician incentive pay is not yet
particularly widely implemented. But as with other industries, the early results in
health care are mixed or inconclusive.243 The meta-studies and systematic
238. See supra Part II.C.
239. See supra Part II.B.3.
240. See id.
241. See Stephen Campbell et al., Quality of Primary Care in England with the Introduction of
Pay for Performance, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 181 (2007); Frank Eijkenaar et al., Effects of Pay for
Performance in Health Care: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, 110 HEALTH POL'Y 115
(2013); Ellen T. Kurtzman et al., Performance-Based Payment Incentives Increase Burden And
Blame For Hospital Nurses, 30 HEALTH AFF. 211 (2011).
242. For instance, many of the studies lack the necessary rigor because they are not randomized
or controlled or have very small sample sizes. Also, many are based simply on physician and
beneficiary surveys but do not use any other quality metrics. Many studies focus either on the cost
question or the quality question, but not both. And there are few long-term studies, in part because
pay-for-performance in health care is relatively new and also frequently changing in format.
Finally, the providers that become subject to incentive pay may reflect selection bias. This is
particularly true in the experiments that study the Pioneer ACOs, where government criteria to
participate in the program was rigorous. See CMS Medicare Shared Savings Fact Sheet, supra note
87 (describing the Pioneer ACO Model).
243. Compare David J. Nyweide et al., Association of Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations
vs Traditional Medicare Fee for Service With Spending, Utilization, and Patient Experience, 313
JAMA 2152 (2015) (finding that pay for performance decreased costs and maintained quality for
most ACOs), and Sule Calikoglu et al., Hospital Pay-For-Performance Programs In Maryland
Produced Strong Results, Including Reduced Hospital-Acquired Conditions, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2649
(2012) (finding that Maryland's Quality Reimbursement Program reduced the prevalence of
45
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analyses summarize that:
* Studies are mixed and inconclusive on whether the use of pay for
performance (P4P) improves the quality of care in primary care.244
* The effects of P4P on quality of care and outcomes remains uncertain as
uncontrolled studies suggest P4P improves quality of care, while higher-
quality studies suggest otherwise.245
* There is a growing trend of rewarding PCPs with financial incentives for
reaching quality benchmarks; however, there is insufficient data to
determine whether the incentives actually improve quality.246
The next subparts consider the evidence to date in more detail.
1. Financial Incentive Effects on Quality Metrics
The majority of empirical work studying provider incentive-based
compensation has focused on the question of quality improvement. One meta-
study reports that out of nine studies on the use of financial incentives to provider
groups, only two found statistically significant improvement in quality metrics.247
In five of the studies, there was a small improvement in the measure of quality
that was not statistically significant.248 In two studies, there was no effect
compared with the control group.249 In general, the analyses suggest that those
with the lowest baseline measures of quality were the easiest to move with
hospital-acquired conditions), with Ruth McDonald & Martin Roland, Pay for Performance in
Primary Care in England and California: Comparison of Unintended Consequences, 7 ANNALS
FAM. MED. 121 (2009) (analyzing the unintended consequences of paying physicians according to
performance, such as destruction of the patient-physician relationship and physician autonomy).
244. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 241, at 119 ("[A]Il authors ... essentially reached the same
conclusion: results are mixed and inconclusive and there is insufficient evidence to support the use
of P4P to improve the quality of preventative and chronic care in primary care.").
245. Sherilyn Houle et al., Does Performance-Based Remuneration for Individual Health Care
Practitioners Affect Patient Care? A Systematic Review, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 889, 889
(2012) ("Uncontrolled studies (15 before-after studies, 2 cohort comparisons) suggested that P4P
improves quality of care, but higher-quality studies with contemporaneous controls failed to
confirm these findings. . . . The effect of P4P targeting individual practitioners on quality of care
and outcomes remains largely uncertain.").
246. Anthony Scott et al., The Effect of Financial Incentives on the Quality of Health Care
Provided by Primary Care Physicians, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS., at 2 (2011)
("The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare
services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of
financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed
with caution .... ).
247. Laura A. Peterson et al., Does Pay-for-Performance Improve the Quality of Health Care?,
145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 265, 267 (2006).
248. Peterson et al., supra note 247, at 267.
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financial incentives.250 And process-of-care measures were more sensitive to
incentive effects than outcome measures.251
Other systematic analyses tend to find that some quality metrics are
252
correlated with the financial incentive, while others do not. For instance, one
study found a positive correlation between the incentive and quality of care for
diabetes and asthma, but not for heart disease.253 Another study also found
significant variation in metrics, finding better results for immunizations than
- 254cancer screenings.
But in general, studies have found that process measures are easier to move
255
than patient outcomes.25 This has generally been seen as problematic in the
industry because its ultimate goal is to improve outcomes rather than just
processes.
A study done at Fairview Health Services is also instructive. Fairview is a
256
Pioneer ACO that operates forty-four primary-care clinics in Minnesota. In
April 2011, Fairview implemented a compensation model that tied primary care
physician compensation to clinic-level performance on quality metrics.257
250. Id. at 268-69.
251. Id. at 269.
252. See, e.g., R. Adams Dudley et al., Strategies to Support Quality-Based Purchasing: A
Review of the Evidence, 10 TECHNICAL REVIEW, at i, v (July, 2004) (finding a correlation with
incentive for only seven out of eleven metrics); Robert Town et al., Economic Incentives and
Physicians' Delivery of Preventive Care - A Systematic Review, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 234,
234 (2005) (finding only one out of eight outcomes significantly improved with financial
incentive).
253. See Jon B. Christianson et al., Lessons from Evaluations of Purchaser Pay-for-
Performance Programs: A Review of the Evidence, 65 MED. CARE RES. & REV., 5S, 19S (2008). -
254. Susan A. Sabatino et al., Interventions to Increase Recommendation and Delivery of
Screening for Breast, Cervical, and Colorectal Cancers by Healthcare Providers Systematic
Reviews of Provider Assessment and Feedback and Provider Incentives, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. S67 (2008); see also Sandra Tanenbaum, Pay for Performance in Medicare: Evidentiary
Irony and the Politics of Value, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 717, 723-24 (2009) (discussing a
study that found a significant improvement on diabetes measurements as a result of pay-for-
performance).
255. See Gerd Flodgren et al., An Overview of Reviews Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Financial Incentives in Changing Healthcare Professional Behaviours and Patient Outcomes,
COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. (2011). But some noted that positive findings
particularly for process measures may be based on increased documentation rather than changed
practices. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 241, at 187-88 (discussing the common criticism
"of pay-for-performance programs that their main effect is to promote better recording of care
rather than better care").
256. Pioneer ACOs were those selected by CMS after a rigorous proposal process because they
are experienced entities ready to share losses in exchange for the opportunity to recoup a higher
percentage of savings achieved. See CMS Medicare Shared Savings Fact Sheet, supra note 87
(describing the Pioneer ACO Model).
257. Prior to 2011, Fairview utilized a traditional fee-for-service model with the possibility of a
small annual quality bonus. See Jessica Greene et al., Large Performance Incentives Had The
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Specifically, forty percent of physician compensation was based on performance
on five quality metrics: diabetes care (12%), vascular care (12%), cancer
screening (6%), depression care (6%), and asthma care (4%) .258 For example, if a
clinic performed at the state median for diabetes care, then twelve percent of the
physician's salary would be at median market salary. But if the clinic performed
above that median, physicians would receive above market salary for that twelve
percent of their compensation (based on a sliding scale). And if the clinic
performed below the state median for that metric, the physician would receive
below market salary for that twelve percent. If performance on a metric was
particularly poor (below twenty percent of the state median), a physician could
receive no compensation at all for that portion of their salary.
Fairview's data was studied to determine whether the incentive model
correlated with greater improvement on quality metrics than for comparable
groups of physicians not using incentive-based compensation.259 The study
"found that Fairview's improvement . .. was not greater than the improvement in
other comparable Minnesota medical groups."260 But providers who were the
poorest performers at the start of the study improved the most relative to other
groups.261 And performance pay seemed to narrow the variation in quality among
the participating clinics. Overall, though, the study concluded that "[t]he large
quality incentive fell short of its overall quality-improvement aim."262 Many
other studies similarly have found no difference in quality-improvement rates
between the participating group and the control group.263
On the other hand, some studies have found success in using financial
incentives to improve quality metrics, particularly in the Medicare context.264 The
Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration is one example. Researchers
there found an improvement in quality associated with paying financial
258. Compensation under a pay-for-performance system "can range from small bonuses for
performance on a few quality indicators to as much as one-quarter of a provider's income for
performance on over 100 metrics." Id. Fairview is an interesting example because forty-percent
incentive pay is quite high relative to most other pay-for-performance schemes. Id at 674.
259. The study methodology compared improvement on performance metrics (determined by
comparing data from pre-incentive compensation to data post-incentive compensation) by Fairview





263. Andrew Ryan & Jan Blustein, The Effect of the MassHealth Hospital Pay-for-Performance
Program on Quality, 46 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 712 (2011) (finding the Massachusetts Medicaid
hospital pay-for-performance program did not improve quality of care); Rachel Werner et al., The
Effect of Pay-for-Performance in Hospitals: Lessons for Quality Improvement, 30 HEALTH AFF.
690, 694-95 (2011) (finding no difference in mortality rates between hospitals using the Medicare
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive program and nonparticipating hospitals).
264. See Karan Ho et al., Can Incentives to Improve Quality Reduce Disparities?, 45 HEALTH
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bonuses.265 Although the data is not focused solely on physician-level incentives,
some of the more recent data from the early years of the Pioneer ACOs is
optimistic, at least in the aggregate. Pioneer ACO data from CMS suggests
modest improvements in quality over the three years in the program. Between
year two and year three, ACOs improved by 3.6 percent on average across the
thirty-three quality measures on which ACOs must report.26 6 Also, in five out of
267
seven measures, patient experience scores improved.
In short, though, more data, and more study is needed in this area to report
any conclusive results. Particularly as to physician pay, many programs are still
in their infancy. As these programs scale up, more data will be available to
analyze.
2. Link to Cost Reduction
A number of studies also assess the extent to which pay for performance can
be linked to cost savings. The most salient inquiry is whether cost savings can be
achieved while quality metrics are simultaneously maintained or improved. The.
purpose of incentive-pay models is not to achieve cost savings at the sacrifice of
quality. Arguably that was the problem with HMOs.
Again, results are mixed. Some are positive. For instance, one study found
evidence of cost-effectiveness for twelve measures included in the quality and
outcomes framework.268 Another study of the Yale New Haven. Health System
found the implementation of quality indicators reduced hospital costs per
patient.269 Others actually found that where quality improves as intended, cost
270
increases rather than decreases.
265. Carrie Colla et al., Spending Differences Associated With the Medicare Physician Group
Practice Demonstration, 308 JAMA 1015 (2012). Although note that for Medicare's Premier
Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, it seemed for the first two years that process of care
quality indicators improved more rapidly for the incentive hospitals than control hospitals, but
differences between the two groups were not detectable by five years out, and patient outcomes did
not improve. Werner et al., supra note 263.
266. See Pioneer ACO Model: Performance Year 3, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/pioneeraco-fncl-py3.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPW3-FR8W];
Pioneer ACO Model: Performance Year 3, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/pioneeraco-fncl-py2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW2T-ZXNF].
267. Sources cited supra note 266.
268. Anne Mason et al., The GMS Quality and Outcomes Framework: Are the QOF Indicators a
Cost-Effective Use of NHS Resources?, in QUALITY AND OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK: JOINT EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY REPORTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (2008).
269. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, AHRQ Quality Indicators Case Study:
Yale New Haven Health System, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY 3 (Nov. 2015), http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov
/Downloads/Resources/Case Studies/AHRQQIYNHHS_Case_Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W6T-279T].
270. Martin Emmert et al., Economic Evaluation of Pay-for-Performance in Health Care: A
Systematic Review, 13 EUR. J. HEALTH EcoN. 755, 762 (2012) ("A majority of studies showed that
improved quality of care can be achieved with higher costs.").
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The meta and systemic analyses summarize that incentive-based
compensation "can potentially be (cost-)effective, but the evidence is not
convincing; many studies failed to find an effect and there are still few studies
that convincingly disentangled the [incentive] effect from the effect of other
improvement initiatives."2 7 '
Again, the Medicare data is perhaps the most promising. In the Medicare
Physician Group Practice Demonstration, with the improvement in quality
described in the prior subpart, researchers also found a modest reduction in the
growth of spending for most Medicare beneficiaries.272
3. Unintended Consequences
Several studies have also investigated whether incentive pay yields
unintended consequences. In other words, some providers might succeed in
improving quality and decreasing cost, but might do so in ways that have
undesirable effects in other areas.
First, policymakers have been concerned that physician financial incentives
will result in adverse selection, where physicians cherry pick the easier cases
while harder cases receive less attention. Some researchers have noted this
possibility, but empirical evidence remains sparse.273 One study of performance
incentives for providers of substance abuse treatment found that the numbers of
severely ill patients in the control group increased while those in the treatment
group (for which financial incentives were awarded) decreased.2 74
Second, some studies have assessed whether incentive pay tied to certain
procedures or categories of care has negative spillover effects on unincentivized
procedures. But results are conflicting or inconclusive. One study compared
trends between incentivized and unincentivized metrics and found no difference
between the two.275 Other studies found that quality deteriorated somewhat for
276non-incentivized measures. Interestingly, one study found that "unincentivized
measures improved when they were part of a condition for which there were
271. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 241, at 115.
272. Colla et al., supra note 265.
273. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 241, at 124.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Andrew Ryan, Effects of the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration
on Medicare Patient Mortality and Cost, 44 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 821, 837-38 (2009) ("[M]ortality
rates for PHQID participants follow similar trends to noneligible hospitals immediately before and
after the PHQID began for the nonincentivized conditions (stroke and gastrointestinal
hemorrhage.").
276. Tim Doran et al., Effect of Financial Incentives on Incentivized and Non-Incentivized
Clinical Activities: Longitudinal Analysis of Data from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework,
342 BMJ d3590 (2011), http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/342/bmj.d3590.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UL2-KRS6] (finding small detrimental effects for that performance on non-
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incentives for other measures."277 Spillover effects may exist. If they do, it is
unclear if they tend to be positive or negative in nature.
Third, there has been concern over gaming the system or cheating on the
metrics. There is some evidence to suggest that manipulating data to increase
compensation is occurring, but nothing conclusive has been shown.278
The fourth unintended consequence concerns whether the use of financial
incentives affects the intrinsic motivation of providers or provider
professionalism. Here, there is some evidence that the use of incentive-pay
results in a loss of professional autonomy, which has negative effects on
motivation and professionalism.279 On the flip side, there is evidence that
incentives work less well to motivate changes in behavior when they run up
against entrenched professional norms.280
Relatedly, some studies have noted that the use of incentive pay has
adversely affected the physician-patient relationship.281 For instance, physicians
have reported resentment toward non-compliant patients who negatively impact
their compensation.282 In one study, physicians also reported pressure to convince
patients to agree to certain treatments or to bypass the informed-consent
283process.
In general, it is hard to draw concrete lessons from this very preliminary and'
mixed data. But it at least suggests that the predictions of the incomplete
contracts literature may bear out in the health industry, as they seem to do in the
executive compensation, education, and professional sports examples, and that
there may be additional challenges unique to the health-care context. As such, the
incomplete-contracts literature is a valuable tool for helping the industry to
capitalize on the positive effects of this contracting strategy, while minimizing
the negative effects. Doing so requires a much closer focus on the contexts in
277. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 241, at 124.
278. See Edward Norton, Incentive Regulation of Nursing Homes, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 105,
123-127 (1992) (explaining how nursing homes under an incentive programs could "game to
receive bonus payments"); see also Peterson et al., supra note 247, at 267 (finding that U.S. nursing
homes were admitting "extremely disabled" patients who later recovered over a short period of
time); Pieter van Herck et al., Systematic review: Effects, Design Choices, and Context of Pay-for-
Performance in Health Care, 10 BMC HEALTH SERVS. REs. 247 (2010) (noting limited evidence of
gaming).
279. McDonald & Roland, supra note 243, at 124 (2009).
280. Jillian Chown, Situated Professionalism: When Do Financial Incentives Influence
Professional Behavior? (Oct. 23, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/orgs-markets/past/pdf/Chown.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5EL-
DPFK].
281. See, e.g., Christina et al., supra note 253; Ruth George et al., Value-Based Purchasing and
the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 28 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 341 (2013).
282. McDonald & Roland, supra note 243.
283. Id. Note that it is this concern-about the effect of incentive pay on the doctor-patient
relationship-that has caused Tom Price, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is also
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which incentive pay is likely to succeed compared to those in which it is unlikely
to do so. The next Part takes up that question and starts the conversation on how
the health industry might implement incentive pay in a much narrower set of
circumstances-ones where it is more likely to have the desired effects.
IV. A NEW FOCUS: TARGETING INCENTIVE PAY TO COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED
TASKS [N HEALTH CARE
While the industry is firmly behind incentive-based pay for doctors, it is not
novel to suggest that incentive pay is potentially problematic. Those who raise
concerns about it, however, tend to fall into one of two camps: they either think
(1) we have not yet gotten incentive pay right;284 or (2) incentive pay is
fundamentally flawed and cannot be fixed.285 This Article stakes out a new
middle position. Because the contracts literature suggests that context is so
important, the primary focus for the health-care industry should be on
determining where to implement incentive pay and where not to.
At present, little is being done to focus implementation. Whereas incentive
pay began in the context of HMOs using process measures for primary-care
physicians, it is now being used across delivery models for all types of
physicians, and across a broad spectrum of quality measures. Indeed, the
movement has been to expand implementation of incentive pay from process
measures to outcome measures, which may be the exact wrong approach.
Incentive pay seems to be a better fit for compliance-oriented tasks that are
not cognitively complex. When tasks are complex or require innovation or
creativity, concerns about hyperfocus, cheating, and the counter-motivational
effects of financial incentives become salient. As Michael Dorff explained,
"[P]erformance pay works great for mechanical tasks like soldering a circuit but
works poorly for tasks that are deeply analytic or creative."2 86 Giving someone
financial incentives is not going to make them magically better at a difficult task
or more innovative or creative. In fact, it can negatively impact their intrinsic
motivation to succeed in such contexts.287
284. These scholars generally argue that pay for performance can be improved by identifying
better quality metrics or changing the magnitude or delivery model of the incentives. See, e.g.,
Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate?, 7 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 5 (2007); Werner et al., supra note 263, at 691.
285. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 19, at 536 (2014) (suggesting moving to nonfinancial or expost
rewards instead).
286. James Surowiecki, Why C.E.O. Pay Reform Failed, NEW YORKER (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/why-c-e-o-pay-reform-failed
[https://perma.cc/568W-BGEY] (quoting Michael Dorff).
287. Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives Reduce
Intrinsic Motivation? Comparing Behaviors Studied in Psychological and Economic Literatures, 32
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 950, 950-53 (2013); Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Does Money Really Affect
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This Part starts the conversation, suggesting some ways the health-care
industry might draw the line between contexts to implement incentive pay and
contexts not to.
A. Big Data and Evidence-Based Medicine
The Big Data movement has created a lot of buzz across industries in recent
years. Big Data refers to the ability to analyze large datasets to find correlations
and make predictions about behavior.288 Big Data is now commonly used to
better understand customer behaviors and preferences to better target consumer
marketing. For instance, Wal-Mart uses Big Data to more accurately predict
289
which products will sell. Insurance companies also use Big Data, for instance
to better detect fraudulent claims.290 And the government uses Big Data to get
ahead of security threats.291
The health-care industry was somewhat late to join the Big Data movement,
but the revolution is now fully underway.292 There are four major pools of data
288. Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX
65, 77 (2014) (explaining that Big Data refers to collection and storage of large data sets, but also
data mining and predictive analytics to process data, make predictions or discover correlations, and
drive decisions).
289. See Bernard Marr, Big Data, Walmart and The Future of Retail, LINKEDIN: PULSE (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/big-data-walmart-future-retail-bernard-marr
[https://perma.cc/7H4R-BN4Z]; see generally Bernard Marr, Big Data: A Game Changer in The
Retail Sector, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sitesIbernardmarr/2015/11/10/big-
data-a-game-changer-in-the-retail-sector [https://perma.cc/JCU8-LLH9] (discussing the use of Big
Data in retail).
290. See Mark Isbitts, Preventing Health Care Fraud with Big Data and Analytics,
LEXISNEXIS: INSIGHTS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/insights/health-care-fraud-layered-
approach.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6SU-KY29] (last accessed Jan. 7, 2017); see also Andrea
Eichhorn, Leverage Big Data to Fight Claims Fraud, IBM SOFTWARE (June 2013), http://www-
935.ibm.com/services/multimedia/Exploiter le_BigDatapour_1utter contre_1a_fraudeaux sinist
resJuin 2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWK8-6ZBT].
291. See John Podesta et al., Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE PRESIDENT 27 (May 1, 2014), https://www.obamawhitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/docs/bigdataprivacyreport may_l_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5UU-WT34];
Bernhard Warner, What the Intelligence Community is Doing With Big Data, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2013),
http-//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-05/what-the-intelligence-community-is-doing-with-big-data
[httpsJ/permacc/P6HX-PXQB]; Press Release, MeriTalk, MeriTalk Study Shows 81 Percent of Federal
Government Agencies Using Big Data Analytics to Cut Cybersecurity Breaches (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://meritalk-qlmsnaybldf.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2 016/08/49503-
MeriTalk Cloudera Dismuptive PressReleaseFINAL_082916.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PPE-Y4TB].
292. For instance, Kaiser Permanente has implemented HealthConnect, a system designed to
ensure data exchange across facilities to reduce cost and improve quality. Connectivity, KAISER
PERMANENTE, https://share.kaiserpermanente.org/total-health/connectivity [https://perma.cc/6XLS-
VHWL]; Neil Versel, Big Data Helps Kaiser Close Healthcare Gaps, INFORMATIONWEEK:
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/electronic-
health-records/big-data-helps-kaiser-close-healthcare-gaps/d/d-id/ 1108977 [https://perma.cc/F68Y-
2AKU]. Blue Shield of California, in partnership with NantHealth, is similarly developing an
integrated technology system. Press Release, Blue Cross Calif., NantHealth and Blue Shield of
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available in health care: activity (claims) and cost data, clinical data,
pharmaceutical R&D data, and patient behavior and sentiment data.293 These data
are already being used to fast track and improve medical research by finding
important correlations without the need to enroll patients in new clinical studies
and by vastly improving sample sizes.294 They are also being used to personalize
medicine to make better diagnostic predictions and treatment suggestions.295 And
they are being used to predict epidemics and improve public health.296
Some have said that Big Data will be important to the success of incentive
pay because stakeholders will need to use it to improve outcomes and obtain the
financial reward.297 But Big Data has the potential to do something else-to help
determine where financial incentives should even be employed in the first place.
Big Data can help the industry understand where incentives work and where
they do not in a number of different ways. First, it can improve the available
information that now mostly comes from discrete studies. With claims data,
outcome data, and information about where financial incentives were used, Big
Data can yield very useful insight on where financial incentives seem to work
and where they do not.
Big Data can also improve current attempts at evidence-based medicine.298
The goal of evidence-based medicine is to identify situations where a treatment is
highly correlated with a positive outcome. If such scenarios can be identified, and
all that is required is compliance, or implementation of a clear directive, those are
situations where- incentive pay is likely to be particularly effective. Many
California Form Proactive Healthcare Collaborative to Coordinate and Personalize Care (Oct. 2,
2012), https://www.blueshieldca.com/bsca/about-blue-shield/media-center/nant-10 0 2 12 .sp
[https://perma.cc/Z64W-6MW7].
293. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 128 (2014); Basel Kayyali et al., The Big-
Data Revolution in US Health Care: Accelerating Value and Innovation, McKINSEY & COMPANY
(Apr. 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health-systems-andservices/the-big-
data revolution in us health care [https://perma.cc/2UME-PN6V].
294. See, e.g., CAPRICORN, http://capricorncdrn.org/?pageid=88 [https://perma.cc/JU5K-
99QD]; Ho Ting Wong et al., Big Data as a New Approach in Emergency Medicine Research, 4 J.
ACUTE DISEASE 178 (2015); Jennifer Frankovich et al., Evidence-Based Medicine in the EMR Era,
365 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1758 (2011); Jake Luo et al., Big Data Application in Biomedical Research
and Health Care: A Literature Review, 8 BIOMED INFORM INSIGHTS 1 (2016).
295. See Maryam Panahiazar, Empowering Personalized Medicine with Big Data and Semantic
Web Technology: Promises, Challenges, and Use Cases, 2014 PROC. IEEE INT'L CONF. BIG DATA
790 (Oct. 2014).
296. Bernard Marr, How Big Data is Changing Healthcare, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/04/21/how-big-data-is-changing-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/VBD7-F4Q7].
297. In this new environment, health-care stakeholders have greater incentives to compile and
exchange information. See, e.g., Sean Gleeson et al., Evaluating a Pay-for-Performance Program
for Medicaid Children in an Accountable Care Organization, 170 JAMA PEDIATRICS 259 (2016)
(studying data to test whether financial incentives improved physician performance in ACO serving
Medicaid children).
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physicians have opposed the idea of evidence-based medicine-and the idea that
physicians should rely on efficacy data in making decisions about care-on the
basis that professional judgment is important and that medicine is part science,
and also part art.299 It is undoubtedly true that not all of medicine can be reduced
to a study of the data. But the data can help to differentiate between aspects of
medicine where individual judgment is important, and aspects where compliance
with established practices is desired.300
The proliferation of electronic health record (EHR) systems is one form of
Big Data that can have a profound effect on evidence-based medicine. EHRs can
"report timely data that could facilitate surveillance of infectious diseases,
disease outbreaks, and chronic illnesses."30  EHRs can then be analyzed to
identify medical procedures that are most effective at treating illnesses.
Standardizing EHR systems is particularly important to these goals.
But there are some challenges to this approach. For one, much of the
necessary information is siloed, with some in the hands of payers and some held
by providers and hospitals. Stakeholders would need to find effective ways to
share data. But some of that is already occurring, and the ACA's push toward
collaborative care should help.
There are also privacy and confidentiality concerns. And it is possible that
the analysis will ultimately tell us that there are not many areas of practice where
tasks can be routinized. But nonetheless, there is reason to believe that Big Data
may hold some answers here.
B. Physicians vs. Other Health Providers
Another possibility to consider is the distinction that industry has already
drawn between the work that physicians do and the work that advanced practice
clinicians do.302 Advanced practice providers are medical providers who are not
299. See Joshua J. Goldman & Tiffany L. Shih, The Limitations ofEvidence-Based Medicine-
Applying Population-Based Recommendations to Individual Patients, 13 AMA J. ETHICS 26, 26
(2011); Hasnain-Wynia Romana, Is Evidence-Based Medicine Patient-Centered and is Patient-
Centered Care Evidence-Based?, 41 HEALTH SERVS. REs. 1, 4 (2006).
300. Evidence from early attempts at pay-for-performance suggests that changes to process
often did not beget better outcomes. See Werner et al., supra note 263, at 691.The hope is that Big
Data can more effectively determine the right processes that will beget better outcomes. Much of
health care cannot be reduced to tried and true processes (think about difficult patients with
multiple comorbidities) but also much of it can.
301. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical
Databases, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 56 (2013).
302. Advanced practice providers are sometimes referred to as mid-level practitioners. See, e.g.,
21 C.F.R. § 1300.01 ("Mid-level practitioner means an individual practitioner, other than a
physician, dentist, veterinarian, or podiatrist, who is licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted by
the United States or the jurisdiction in which he/she practices, to dispense a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice. Examples of mid-level practitioners include, but are not limited
to, health care providers such as nurse practitioners, nurse midwives, nurse anesthetists, clinical
nurse specialists and physician assistants who are authorized to dispense controlled substances by
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physicians but who are licensed to diagnose and treat patients, sometimes under
the supervision of a physician.303 Advanced practice providers include physician
assistants (PAs) and nurse practitioners (NPs), among other categories.
A PA, according to the American Academy of Physician Assistants, is a
"nationally certified and state-licensed medical professional" who practices "on
healthcare teams with physicians and other providers."304 PAs perform a range of
activities, usually (but not always) in the realm of primary care. Most commonly,
they take medical histories and perform physical examinations, order and
interpret lab tests, diagnose and treat common illnesses, and prescribe medication
to treat those illnesses.305 The number of PAs in practice in the United States is
proliferating.306 Studies suggest they provide quality care in the areas in which
they practice that is comparable to the care provided by physicians.307
An NP is a registered nurse who has additional training in physical
diagnosis, psycho-social assessment, and health management in primary care.308
Most NPs can order tests, diagnose common acute and chronic conditions, and
prescribe medication.309 Increasingly, NPs are practicing independently, rather
than under the supervision of physicians.3 10
the State in which they practice."). However, many in the profession have objected to the descriptor
"mid-level" to apply to a group of professionals with advanced degrees. See, e.g., Catherine S.
Bishop, Advanced Practitioners Are Not Mid-Level Providers, 3 J. ADVANCED PRAC. ONCOLOGY
287 (2012); Michael D. Pappas, Stop Calling Nurse Practitioners Mid-Level Providers, KEvINMD
(Jul. 14, 2014), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/07/stop-calling-nurse-practitioners-mid-level-
providers.html [https://perma.cc/Y893-7AKX]. As such, this Article will employ the term advanced
practice providers or practitioners.
303. See, e.g,, Ruth McCorkle, Transition to a New Cancer Care Delivery System: Opportunity
for Empowerment of the Role of the Advanced Practice Provider, 3 J. ADVANCED PRAC. ONCOLOGY
34 (2012) (defining advanced practice provides to include nurse practitioners and physician
assistants).
304. See What is a PA?, AM. ACAD. PAs, https://www.aapa.org/What-is-a-PA
[https://perma.cc/F8UV-MMU6].
305. Id.
306. See Occupational Outlook Handbook: Physician Assistants, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Dec. 17,
2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/physician-assistants.htm [https://perma.cc/EHS6-
QLTP]; 2015 Statistical Profile of Certified Physicians Assistants, NAT'L COMMISSION ON
CERTIFICATION PHYSICLANS ASSISTANTS (Mar. 2016), https://www.nccpa.net/Uploads/docs
/2015StatisticalProfileofCertifiedPhysicianAssistants.pd [https://perma.cc/R6S4-ZYM2] (stating
that the PA profession grew 35.9% between 2010 and 2015).
307. See Amitesth Agarwal et al., Process and Outcome Measures among COPD Patients with a
Hospitalization Cared for by an Advance Practice Provider or Primary Care Physician, PLOS ONE
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=1 0.1371 /joumal.pone.01 48522
[https://perma.cc/HWH6-SPEW]; Mary 0. Mundinger et al., High Quality of Care: Primary Care
Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283
JAMA 59 (2000).
308. See What is an NP?, AM. Ass'N NURSE PRACTITIONERS, https://www.aanp.org/all-about-
nps/what-is-an-np [https://perma.cc/3WNX-QWD3].
309. Id.
310. See John K. Inglehart, Meeting the Demand for Primary Care: Nurse Practitioners Answer
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There is some controversy about how to define the scope of medical
practice-tasks that can only be done by physicians and not other health
providers-given the proliferation of these advanced practice practitioners.
While there are some differences at the state level,3 11 the general idea is that these
practitioners are permitted to do much of the more-routine and less-complex
312
work that used to be solely within the purview of physicians3. According to the
American Health Lawyers Association, "[t]he general consensus is that these
practitioners provide patient care services requiring less acuity and which are
more routine, thereby freeing up physicians to focus their attention upon cases
with greater complexity."3 13
Therefore, one possibility is to apply incentive pay to the work of PAs and
NPs, but not to physicians. If incentive pay is a better match for compliance-
oriented tasks that do not require innovation, this might be one way to draw the
line.
A counter argument, though, is that not all work that PAs and NPs do is
routine or compliance based, particularly to the extent that they have to employ
their judgment to make diagnoses. Advanced practice providers, too, will
encounter complex cases in their practice that will require creativity and high
levels of effort. It is not clear, for instance, that an office visit requiring an
advanced practice provider to diagnose an illness is more rote and less creative
than a surgery a physician has performed 10,000 times. Additionally, these
advanced practice practitioners may have high levels of intrinsic motivation that
incentive pay could crowd out. In short, it is not clear that applying incentive pay
to advanced practice practitioners instead of physicians would have the desired
effect, but there is reason to at least test this method, particularly because a high
force/Inglehart-PC-Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UGV-CWHC]; Amanda Van Vleet & Julia
Paradise, Tapping Nurse Practitioners to Meet Rising Demand for Primary Care, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/tapping-nurse-practitioners-to-meet-
rising-demand-for-primary-care [https://perma.cc/P2DC-X43T].
311. See, e.g., Physician Assistant Practice Act of 1987, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 95/4 (2013)
(defining the scope of practice for PAs practicing in Illinois); South Carolina Physician Assistants
Practice Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-935 (2016) (defining the scope of practice for PAs practicing
in South Carolina); Physician Assistant Scope of Practice, IND. CODE § 25-27.5-5-1 to -6 (2016)
(defining scope of practice for PAs practicing in Indiana).
312. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 95/4 (2013) (defining the scope of practice for PAs
practicing in Illinois); PA Scope of Practice, AM. ACAD. PAs (Jan.
2017), https://www.aapa.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=583 [https://perma.cc/FN4L-
R5H4]; State Practice Environment, AM. ASS'N NURSE PRACTITIONERS
https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-legislation/state-practice-environment
[https://perma.cc/R2R6-ZG58].
313. Almeta E. Cooper & Paul W. Kim, Mid-level Practitioners in the Hospital Setting:
Physician Assistants and Advanced Practice Nurses, AM. HEALTH LAw. Ass'N (AHLA-Papers
P02070218, Feb. 7, 2002); see also Jessica Wolf, Eliminating Scope of Practice Barriers for
Illinois Physician Assistants, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L.: ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 16, 17-18 (2013) ("PAs
play an integral role in the delivery of health care by managing common diagnoses, providing
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percentage of the work they do is more likely to be compliance-based than in
other areas of medicine.
C. Preventive Care vs. Responsive Treatment
One final idea is to utilize incentive pay for preventive care, but not
responsive care. Preventive care is care that can help people avoid illness and
improve general health.3 14 It includes care such as diagnostic testing, well visits,
or vaccinations.315 Preventive care is, for the most part, routine, and does not
require innovation or creativity. Therefore, it might be a good fit for incentive-
based compensation.
Many in the industry believe that improving preventive care will not only
improve actual health, but will also reduce health costs and improve quality of
care.316 The idea is similar to why parties should specify contracts ex ante-to
prevent additional costs ex post. It is cheaper to vaccinate people than to treat
them if they become very ill from a preventable illness.317 And it is cheaper to
screen for cancer and catch it early than not to engage in screening.31s Yet, too
little preventive care is being done.
319
314. On the other hand, responsive care refers to treating a problem or disease once it manifests.
315. See Preventive Care, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Jul. 27, 2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-law/preventive-care/index.html [https://perma.cc/MJV3-
C2WJ].
316. See Building Healthier Communities by Investing in Prevention, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/building-
healthier-communities-by-investing-in-prevention/index.html [https://perma.cc/CYE7-G9T5]. But
see Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment-Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes,
368 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1713 (2013) (describing a study where access to preventive services through
Medicaid coverage was found to improve mental health, although not physical outcomes). But see
Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential
Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 (2008) (critiquing the assumption that preventive care will
reduce costs).
317. This proposition is not without controversy. Compare Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic
Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in the United States, 2009, 133
PEDIATRICS 577 (2014) (finding that routine childhood immunizations result in net savings of $13.5
billion in direct costs and $68.8 billion in total societal costs), with David Brown, In the Balance:
Some Candidates Disagree, but Studies Show It's Often Cheaper to Let People Get Sick, WASH.
POST (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/04
/AR2008040403803.html [https://perma.cc/85MG-3MT3] (discussing evidence that preventive
care, including vaccines, may not actually save money long-term).
318. See The Economics of Cancer Prevention and Control, UNION INT'L CANCER
PREVENTION & CONTROL (2014), http://www.iccp-portal.org/sites/default/files/resources
/WCLS2014 economics-of cancer FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CFH-PGCW] (describing
the economic benefits of prevention). But see William Black et al., Cost-Effectiveness of CT
Screening in the National Lung Screening Trial, 371 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1793 (2014) (finding that
screening actually costs an additional $81,000 per quality adjusted life year gained.).
319. See Kimberly S.H. Yarnall et al., Primary Care: Is There Enough Timefor Prevention?, 93
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 635 (2003) (finding that time constraints limit primary care physicians' ability
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Part of the problem is that under fee for service, even with recent bumps in
rates, preventive care tends to yield low rates of reimbursement for providers.320
Providers need an incentive to encourage patients to obtain preventive care.
Incentive-based compensation could provide that incentive. Indeed, part of the
motivation of the new incentive-based schemes under the ACA was to address
this problem-to give providers a reason to have their eyes on the long-term
health of their patients.
Some attempts at tying payment incentives to increasing rates of preventive
care services have generated positive results.321 But also, many of the early
experiments in pay for performance tended to focus on preventive care, and there
is no evidence to date that those experiments were more effective than the
322
broader implementation currently being undertaken. As such, more study and
experimentation with this targeted implementation needs to be done.
CONCLUSION
The health-care industry has rallied behind a far-reaching implementation of
incentive pay, one that applies across delivery models, to generalist and specialty
physicians, and to a wide range of procedures and diagnoses. The contracts
literature suggests that this is too blunt of an approach. Task specification and
control-based contracting that utilizes monitoring and financial incentives tends
to work best for ensuring compliance. But it works less well for motivating
consummate performance because it can signal distrust and crowd out social and
professional norms that would otherwise have operated to improve performance.
Task specification coupled with control mechanisms can also lead to
gamesmanship and cheating on the metrics to secure increased compensation.
The health-care industry should be focusing on where to implement incentive pay
to capture its benefits for compliance and standardization, but minimize its
negative impact on innovation and the operation of positive norms. The new
Trump Administration has an opportunity to study this issue further and to claw
back some of the misguided attempts to implement incentive pay where it is
likely to have mal-effects. These are lessons to be extrapolated to other
industries, as well.
320. Physician Payment Report, supra note 53, at 15; Adam Atherly & Karoline Mortensen,
Medicaid Primary Care Physician Fees and the Use of Preventive Services Among Medicaid
Employees, 49 HEATLH SERvs. RES. 1306 (2014).
321. See Janusz Kaczorowski, Views of Family Physicians Before and After Participation in a
Reminder and Recall Project (P-PROMPT), 57 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 690 (2011).
322. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, Physician Financial Incentives and Feedback: Failure to Increase
Cancer Screening in Medicaid Managed Care, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1699 (1998); Meredith B.
Rosenthal, How Will Paying for Performance Affect Patient Care?, 8 AMA J. ETHICS 162 (2006).
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